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RUSSIA'S TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP
AND CO-OPERATION IN ASIA

Michael Alan Lennon

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

RUSSIA'S TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP
AND CO-OPERATION IN ASIA

by

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March 1980

Thesis Advisor:

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The Soviet Union utilizes the Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance to legitimize and legalize aspects of its foreign policy: military material and personnel assistance; counter the major power influence; increase Soviet security; political and economic actions.

This thesis examines the Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance and its application in Asia. It examines four Asian signatories of this type of Soviet treaty: Afghanistan, India, Mongolia, Vietnam. The examination attempts to identify those areas of Soviet-Asian foreign policy that have been aided by the Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance.

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RUSSIA'S TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION IN ASIA

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|----|
| INTRODUCTION----- | 9 |
| I. BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO- OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE----- | 11 |
| A. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE TREATY IN INTER- NATIONAL LAW----- | 12 |
| B. TREATY STRUCTURE----- | 23 |
| II. ANALYSIS OF ASIAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO- OPERATION, AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES----- | 35 |
| A. AFGHANISTAN----- | 35 |
| 1. Problem Areas----- | 35 |
| 2. International Security Relations----- | 40 |
| 3. Treaty Effects----- | 46 |
| B. INDIA----- | 50 |
| 1. Problem Areas----- | 50 |
| 2. International Security Relations----- | 54 |
| 3. Treaty Effects----- | 59 |
| C. MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC----- | 61 |
| 1. Problem Areas----- | 61 |
| 2. International Security Relations----- | 62 |
| 3. Treaty Effects----- | 67 |
| D. VIETNAM----- | 69 |
| 1. Problem Areas----- | 69 |
| 2. International Security Relations----- | 72 |
| 3. Treaty Effects----- | 74 |
| III. CONCLUSIONS----- | 76 |
| A. SOVIET BENEFITS FROM TOFCMA'S----- | 76 |
| 1. Asian Collective Security System----- | 76 |
| 2. Asian Balance of Power----- | 78 |
| 3. Strategic Position----- | 80 |
| 4. Soviet Prestige----- | 81 |
| B. SUMMATION----- | 82 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| APPENDIX A: Term/Phrase Interpretation----- | 87 |
| APPENDIX B: Stipulations of Treaties----- | 88 |
| APPENDIX C: Trade/Aid/Credit With USSR----- | 89 |
| APPENDIX D: Arms Trade and Military Expenditures----- | 90 |
| APPENDIX E: Texts of Asian TOFCMA's----- | 94 |
| FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I----- | 109 |
| FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II----- | 112 |
| FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III----- | 118 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY----- | 119 |
| INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST----- | 128 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|--|----|
| TABLE I - Objectives of Soviet Treaty Policy----- | 27 |
| TABLE II - Socialist/Non-Socialist Tendencies of Variables and Variable Groups----- | 31 |
| TABLE III - Ethnic/Linguistic Groups of Afghanistan----- | 37 |
| TABLE IV - Languages of India----- | 50 |
| TABLE V - U.S.S.R. and PRC Aid to Vietnam----- | 73 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | | |
|-----------|---|----|
| Figure 1. | Evaluation of a TOFCMA----- | 32 |
| Figure 2. | Evaluation of a Socialist-Oriented TOFCMA---- | 32 |

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a study of four Treaties of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance that have been concluded in Asia between the Soviet Union and: Mongolia (1966), India (1971), Afghanistan (1978), Vietnam (1978). The treaty with Mongolia, like the earlier treaty with North Korea, is essentially a mutual defense arrangement; and to that extent is substantially more limited than the broader and more recent treaties with Afghanistan, India or Vietnam. The treaty between the USSR and Afghanistan may be looked upon as a model in that it illustrates most graphically the techniques used and the ends pursued by the Soviet Union in linking itself with its Asian allies.

This thesis has proceeded from the assumption that the Soviet Union has utilized the machinery of negotiation as well as military build-up in protecting its interests in Asia. Each single treaty herein discussed may or may not be a part of an ultimate Soviet vision of a system of collective defense in Asia. The treaties show that in each instance the Soviets have achieved a definite measure of success and each successive negotiation may be interpreted as a part of a carefully thought out diplomatic offensive.

Furthermore, it is my hypothesis that the text of a treaty may reveal to a large extent the nature of alignment

which might subsequently be anticipated between the USSR and the individual state concerned. It is reasonable to postulate that future relationships between the USSR and other nations in Asia may follow the model under study. To this extent, the present thesis may contribute a possible basis for predictability of future Soviet aggressive moves towards other Asian nations, utilizing this type of treaty.

By way of conclusion, this thesis suggests that the Soviets are actively pursuing their own concept of a collective security system for Asia; that they are seeking a favorable Asian balance of power; and that they are building the strongest possible position with potential allies who occupy strategic geographic positions. It is beyond argument that the Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance performs a useful role in the pursuit of the Soviet Union's national political and security objectives.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

Since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union has used the Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation, and Mutual Assistance*, commonly referred to as a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, to identify those national governments with close, friendly relations with the USSR and as a tool of Soviet foreign policy. This type of treaty is not intended to be a treaty of peace but a tool of Soviet diplomacy specifically designed to protect and promote the national interests of the Soviet Union.

It has provided the means to legitimize and legalize aspects of the Soviet Union's foreign policy in Asia, including military material and personnel transfers, countering the influence of other major powers, increase its own security, as well as political and economic moves. The Asian TOFCMA's have increasingly become a tool which both the Soviet Union and the other signatories utilize to gain advantage, either materially or psychologically.

The effect of the TOFCMA's on Soviet Asian foreign policy, and on the Asian countries, is very important. The treaty is an important aspect of Soviet international law. The increasing drive of Third World nations to achieve

*Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance will hereafter be called TOFCMA.

political and economic independence is acutely felt in Asia, where major powers offer various types of assistance, with or without conditions attached. The implications of a TOFCMA, both for the Soviet Union and the other signatory requires full comprehension.

A. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

International treaties and agreements are important aspects of relations between states. They can be instruments of stability as well as catalysts and moderators of international relations. Treaties can normalize and order relations among states and can be adapted to general as well as specific situations.

By utilizing treaties, the Soviet Union can clarify and cement its relations with other states at various stages of their development. Treaties have aided the Soviet Union in its own development, whether by fulfillment of treaty obligations or by violating their obligations. Treaties have proven to be a vehicle for Soviet tactical and strategic objectives since the founding of the Soviet state.

The development of a Soviet concept of international law began with the establishment of the USSR. Initial studies in this field were led by N. N. Golubev, dealing with basic theory but not applying it to the Marxist model of government. The first scholar to apply international law to the Soviet form of government in existence at his time

was Ye. A. Korovin. In his view, regarding effects on foreign relations, a "treaty dominates unchallenged and custom is reduced to an auxiliary source."¹

In the 1930's, another Soviet scholar, Ye. B. Pashukanis, continued the molding of international law to fit the Soviet structure of government and foreign policy. Pashukanis believed that international treaties and international customs were sources of international order in a narrow juridical sense. In a broader sense he stated,

Given the extraordinary instability and indefiniteness of the volume of universally recognized principles of international law which are occasionally encountered in our own Soviet notes and treaties should be interpreted with caution. In particular, what is involved in Soviet diplomatic documents is not the rather indefinite totality of so-called 'general principles of international law' taken as a whole, but the sum of customs which have come into being in the sphere of specific relations.²

Pashukanis viewed treaties as acceptable foundations of international relations "between the two systems until the socialist system should establish its superiority beyond the borders of the USSR."³ International custom should be recognized "only within those limitations in which it does not contradict the dictatorship of the proletariat and the principles of our foreign policy."⁴

The militancy of Pashukanis' views gradually abated after the Great Purge. F. I. Kozhevnikov, a professor of international law, published an article in 1940, on the subject of sources of international law:

The basic external sources of positive international law...are, mainly, treaties and agreements between governments, and international customs....The actual political relations between governments are transformed into international law from the moment when they conclude international agreements, or from the moment of their adherence to an already existing treaty, or from the moment of their official announcement concerning some rights or obligations, or on the basis of international custom.⁵

Kozhevnikov's views were later expanded by S. B. Krylov, the first Soviet judge in the International Court of Justice. Krylov proposed four sources of international law:

1. "International treaties, i.e., treaties concluded between states, are the basic source of international law."⁶

2. International custom facilitates international intercourse, resting "upon a practice which has extended over centuries" and in view of the fact that "the content of...international treaties does not cover all the problems of law which arise in international intercourse."⁷ Of interest was Krylov's example of custom as applied to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

In particular, specific rules for the treatment of diplomats who are accredited to us have come into being in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; in other words, a Soviet diplomatic practice has been established, Soviet diplomatic custom. It goes without saying that the protocol customs of the USSR are democratic and simple....⁸

3. Decisions of international organizations, such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, and other permanent or temporary international agencies which, as a source of international law, do "not always receive proper attention,

despite its great significance and the importance of the role it plays."⁹

4. Domestic legislation and court practice of individual nations, only if that legislation or action is recognized by other states. Krylov subordinated this source to the other three sources.

A. Ya. Vyshinskii, a prominent spokesman of Soviet international law, also stressed the importance of the treaty in international law in 1948:

It must be clear to everyone...that solid international law and order can be assured only on the basis of understanding and the recognition of the mutual needs, interests, and rights of sovereign states. That is why the Soviet theory of international law regards the treaty, resting on the principles of the sovereign equality of peoples and the respect for mutual interests and rights, as the basic source of international law. This secures for international law and its institutions full moral as well as juridical force, since at their base will lie the obligations agreed to and voluntarily assumed by nations.¹⁰

In 1955, V. I. Lisovskii authored the first Soviet textbook on international law since the death of Stalin. In it he outlined and discussed five sources of international law:¹¹

1. Treaties (principle, basic source).

2. Judicial precedents of international courts and courts of arbitration as well as pertinent decisions of national courts.

3. International custom.

4. Internal laws - "when they concern or touch upon questions of international intercourse and do not contradict its principle."

5. Decisions and decrees of international organizations "adopted within the limits of their competence and not contradicting the basic principle of international law...even for those states that have not taken direct part in their adoption."

The last Soviet scholar to be discussed is V. M. Shurshalov. While continuing the belief that treaties are the basic source of international law, he also went further:

...contemporary international law is basically treaty law. It follows that the progressive development of international law depends to a significant degree on treaty practice, while international treaties...are at the same time a factor in its constant rejuvenation and perfection.¹²

Shurshalov also maintained that a treaty may be in conflict with the basic principles and concepts of international law, and would be invalid. He defined these values as follows:¹³

1. Universal peace and the security of nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations which are members of the international community.
3. Noninterference in the internal affairs of states.
4. Equality and mutual benefit between nations.
5. The rigorous fulfillment of obligations assumed under treaties.

To summarize the views that have been developed within the Soviet international law community, and form the present structure, it is necessary to review two areas: the basic

principles and concepts of international law; and the sources of international law. The basic principles and concepts include the following:¹⁴

1. The obligation of keeping and protecting the general peace and security.
2. International cooperation among all states.
3. National sovereignty and equality.
4. Noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.
5. Maintenance of trade relations.
6. Conscientious fulfillment of international treaties and obligations.
7. The right to use legal force against violators of treaties and customary international law.
8. National self-determination.
9. The right to the maintenance of diplomatic relations.
10. International legal responsibility for cases of violation of international law.
11. The right to national respect and honor.

The sources of international law include the following:

1. International treaties and agreements.
2. International custom. Why should "the Soviet government be deprived of those rights which require no treaty formulation and derive from the very fact that normal diplomatic relations exist."¹⁵
3. Basic concepts and principles.
4. Decisions of international organizations.

5. Decisions of national courts.
6. Domestic legislation.
7. Doctrine.
8. Codification of international law.
9. Collision norms (avoidance of bi-lateral confrontations).

The Soviet theory of international law views the treaty, resting on the principles of sovereign equality of peoples and the respect for mutual interests and rights, as the fundamental source of international law. The treaty is further defined as an international agreement among states that creates rights and obligations in international law. The treaty is also considered to be the typical and widespread legal form of struggle or cooperation in the realm of political, economic and other relations between states, embodying equality of contracting parties, bilateral acceptability and mutual benefit as basic principles.¹⁶

Two items should be noted concerning the Soviet theory stated above: the Soviet use of the term "states" and the ideological elements of a Soviet treaty. By using the term "states," the Soviets deny international organizations the capacity to enter into international treaties.

The concept of ideology has great significance in Soviet international treaty theory. The Soviets describe the will of the state of the USSR as expressed through its treaties as "the will of the entire people" who rule that state.¹⁷

Capitalist and imperialist states are described as utilizing international treaties as a "device of the foreign policy of imperialism,"¹⁸ and "serves as a form of enslavement by the most powerful states of the weaker countries and is a tool for preparing and realizing imperialist expansion and aggression."¹⁹

The drafting of a treaty involves two important aspects of Soviet theory: language, and legal terms. In 1945, before the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations, Vyacheslav Molotov stated, "I shall speak on this matter in Russian....I know that the Russian language is very well suited for a just cause...."²⁰ The Soviets believe that the Russian language has become one of the diplomatic languages because of its "inherent richness and beauty... and the wealth of its potentialities."²¹

Soviet practice adheres to the principle of complete equality of languages of the contracting parties. Consequently, treaties are drafted for signature in the Russian language and in the language of the other contracting party.

Legal terminology also plays an important part in treaty drafting. The Soviets tend to use common phrasing in many treaties. Normally, this phrasing can be construed in interpretation to mean "in the interest of the Soviet Union." The term "democratic principles" can be read as "consent of the Soviet Union."²² Terms such as nationalization, co-operation, cooperative existence, trusteeship, mutual benefit, neutrality, and assistance are among

the many terms used by the Soviets that can be interpreted to its advantage. Appendix A lists possible interpretations of terms and phrases that are common to Soviet Treaties of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.

The Soviet practice of treaty formation generally adheres to the following guideline: negotiations and individual points of agreement; agreement on treaty text; formal signing of the treaty; ratification by the respective governments.²³

Within the Soviet Union, ratification of a treaty is a problem not of "significance in principle, but primarily of state technique."²⁴ Formal ratification of a treaty is required only if it is a treaty of peace, a treaty of non-aggression and mutual assistance, or where ratification was made a stipulation in the text of the treaty.

The problem of stipulation of a particular length of time in which ratification or the exchange of acts of ratification must be performed is not dealt within Soviet doctrine, but is left to the agreement of the contracting parties. Refusal by a contracting party to ratify a treaty, without any unfavorable consequences, is a principle "fully recognized by the Soviet science of international law."²⁵

"Repudiation of a ratified treaty, without extremely weighty circumstances is at best as international cause celebre, and may easily be followed by reprisals."²⁶ This repudiation, or a nonfulfillment of a treaty obligation, may bring about intervention: direct, indirect, economic,

etc. Soviet policy and practice has been that the injured party "has the right to employ only those measures that are permitted by international law and may demand the fulfillment of only those obligations in relation to which the guarantee has been established."²⁷

In dealing with treaty validity, Soviet theory is based on the premise that a treaty that is in conflict with the basic principles and concepts of international law may be considered invalid. Soviet doctrine sums up these principles (cited earlier) by condemning and declaring invalid, illegal, and criminal, a treaty which is regarded as an obstacle to the further extension of the control of the Soviet foreign policy.²⁸

Changes in the government of a contracting nation do not necessarily serve to lawfully terminate or modify a treaty. Also, with respect to bilateral treaties, war or conflict abrogates some treaties, suspends the operation of some treaties and makes other treaties operative. The criterion for this action is stipulated within the treaty. If it is not, firmly established custom is of great significance.²⁹

Nearly all Soviet treaties have a defined period of operation. The period may be indefinite, such as peace treaties. The period may be for a limited span of time (10, 20, 30 years), such as Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance Treaties. Extensions of the latter treaties may be a specific agreement or it may be included in the treaty for a definite or indefinite period.

Soviet theory classes international treaties into eight categories:

1. Capitalist Treaties: "The most recent techniques for enslaving people and depriving them of sovereignty,"³⁰ and not binding on the Soviet Union.

2. Soviet Treaties With Capitalist States: "The legal form as well as the veritable legal superstructure over the objective essential relations...determined by the coexistence of states in the capitalist camp with the states of the socialist camp...."³¹

3. Socialist Treaties: "Treaties of an economic character, together with treaties on political and cultural co-operation of the countries of the socialist camp...."³²

4. Treaties of Alliance: May be either defensive, combating aggression, or offensive, advancing aggressions that are illegal to start with.

5. Treaties of Mutual Assistance: "Obligate the parties to render mutual aid and support to each other, including military assistance, in the event one of the parties becomes the object of an unprovoked attack on the part of some third state or states."³³

6. Treaties of Non-Aggression: "Parties pledge themselves to refrain from any attack on each other, either individually or in conjunction with one or more other states."³⁴ Aggression is defined as a declaration of war, an invasion, an assault, a naval blockade, or support of armed bands.

7. Treaties of Neutrality: "Obligate one or several states not to take part in a war that may occur between third countries, and not to convert a territory into a theater of military operations or into a military base."³⁵

8. Regional Treaties: "Open defensive political agreements of a group of states within a geographical region."³⁶

Soviet theory and practice of international law has developed into a valuable and convenient tool of the ruling government. Soviet treaty practice has almost without exception determined the general line of the theory of international law.³⁷

B. TREATY STRUCTURE

Having established the importance of treaties to Soviet international law, it is necessary to specifically examine TOFCMA's with regard to commonality, differences, interpretation and predictability.

Throughout all of the Asian treaties, common terminology is a standout. The preambles are nearly identical, except for those treaties with the Communist countries of The Mongolian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The preamble of these two countries also stresses communist and socialist solidarity and fraternal brotherhood.

As can be seen in Appendix B, all of the treaties stress friendship, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, world peace, disarmament, mutual assistance for defense, economic progress,

exchange of opinions on international affairs, and ratification. All of the Asian treaties have a clause pertaining to conflict with existing treaties or prohibition of entering into conflicting treaties. All of the Asian treaties have a definite period of effectiveness, with automatic renewal clauses, if neither party states its desire not to renew the treaty. The length of the initial effective period and the automatic renewal period varies, but is generally longer when a treaty is of higher value, at the time of signing, to the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, India and Mongolia have time periods of twenty years (compared to fifteen years for Egypt and Iraq), whereas the Vietnam treaty has an initial period of twenty-five years and an automatic renewal period length of ten years. Mongolia also has a renewal period of ten years.

Of particular importance to the Soviet Union is interpretation of the treaties so that it is permitted to supply military aid and training, troops, or intervention. In the treaties with Mongolia and Vietnam, there are three separate clauses that permit military aid or intervention. There is the standard clause of offering immediate assistance if the other party is either threatened or attacked by a third state, or states (Afghanistan Art. 4, Vietnam Art. 6). Another clause is the rendering to one another of fraternal aid and support (Mongolia Art. 1, Vietnam preamble and Art. 1). The last clause that would permit military aid or intervention says that necessary steps to defend socialist gains will be

undertaken as needed (Mongolia Art. 5, Vietnam Art. 4). In the Mongolian treaty (Mongolia Art. 5) is a clause to defend to ensure security, independence and territorial integrity of the country, using military measures if necessary.

Military aid, assistance, or intervention in the other treaties is confined largely to the clause of mutual assistance if threatened or attacked (India Art. 9) or co-operation in the military field in increases of defense capability (Afghanistan Art. 4). History has proven that the Soviet Union stretches this clause to meet its needs. India receives military aid from the Soviets even though it is not being attacked nor immediately threatened. Afghanistan receives military aid under the pretext of being attacked from rebel forces external to the country. In both cases, the Soviet aim appears to be containment of, or a lessening of, Chinese influence and support of a pro-Soviet government. Additionally, support to Afghanistan provides the necessary material to keep the pro-Soviet government in power.

A comment should be made at this point on what appears to be a significant change in terminology, and possible intentions. In all the pre-1978 treaties, a clause was enclosed in Art. 1 that support non-interference in internal affairs. In the Soviet-Vietnamese, the clause was changed to non-interference in international affairs. This leaves the way open for the Soviet Union to insure that the Chinese do not gain any control in Vietnam.

The primary objectives that have influenced the Soviet drive to conclude these treaties, and possible future ones can be divided into three categories; objectives dealing with Soviet security, objectives dealing with geography, and objectives dealing with politics.

The objectives dealing with Soviet security are the establishment of a security/buffer zone and controlling those states in that zone. The objectives of geographical nature include containment of the People's Republic of China, spreading Soviet influence, and obtaining access to valuable resources and resource routes. The objectives in politics include strengthening of communism and socialism and lessening the influence of other major nations (People's Republic of China, United States). (See TABLE I.)

With a study of Table I, geography and strategic positioning appear to be the dominating influences. All the treaties are aimed at strengthening pro-Soviet governments, and increasing Soviet influence. In North, Southeast and South Asia, the Soviet Union's primary objective appears to be the containment of the People's Republic of China and causing abatement of Chinese influence. In West and South Asia, the Soviets' primary objective appears to be the strategic position in the world and access to natural resources, and support for pro-Soviet governments. A secondary purpose in west Asia is the lessening of Chinese and American influence.

TABLE I

| Objectives of Soviet Treaty Policy | Afghanistan | India | Mongolia | Vietnam |
|---|-------------|-------|----------|---------|
| Build security/buffer zones | P | | P | |
| Control of security/buffer zone governments | P | | P | |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Increase influence in Asia | S | P | | P |
| Strategic World Position | S | P | | S |
| Chinese containment | P | P | P | P |
| Access to natural resources | | S | S | |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Strengthen Pro-Soviet communist party | P | S | P | P |
| Strengthen Pro-Soviet government | P | S | P | P |
| Support independence of country | S | | S | P |
| Lessen Chinese influence | S | P | P | P |
| Lessen U.S. influence | | P | | S |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| P - Primary Objective | | | | |
| S - Secondary Objective | | | | |

In general these treaties have benefits for each country, but the Soviet Union is in a position to obtain much more benefit in support of its foreign policy. With the wide geographical positions of these treaties, and its willingness to interpret the treaties to its advantage, the Soviet Union can spread its dominance and control throughout Asia to the benefit of the Soviet Union and its communist party.

Interpretation is also very important. Most of the articles and phrases are deliberately vague or general. This permits both the Soviet Union and the other signatory to have a wide scope of legality in which to pursue its foreign policy and act with or against the other. Appendix A provides an interpretation of Soviet definitions of the main clauses of these treaties.

The last section of this chapter will outline the steps needed to predict if a TOFCMA will be a socialist or non-socialist oriented. It is necessary to identify the variables that can be studied, that result in such a TOFCMA, and how these variables' relationships determine whether the treaty will be socialist or non-socialist oriented.

The Soviet Union regards these treaties as providing for a degree of economic and military security, as well as providing an avenue for increasing political influence. The degree of protection and influence provided is generally greater in a socialist-oriented TOFCMA. A socialist-oriented TOFCMA specifically calls for fraternal aid and

support, building socialism and communism, and armed assistance, when other TOFCMA'S make no such specific provisions.

The variables that influence the type of TOFCMA are as follows: (Consider the Soviet Union as the first party.)

1. Perceived Opponent: Does the Soviet Union perceive one country, or an alliance of countries, as a threat?

(Threat is defined as being anti-communist, or having the capability of conducting economic disruption of or military operations against the Soviet Union.)

2. Geographic Location to Perceived Opponent: Is the second party geographically located near (or contiguous to) or far from the perceived opponent?

3. Relations With Perceived Opponent: What is the status of relations between the second party and the perceived opponent? Good or bad?

4. Strategic Location: Does the second party occupy a strategic location: military, political or economic?

5. Buffer State Location: Is the second party geographically located to be utilized as a buffer state by the Soviet Union?

6. Power Politics: Is the Soviet Union attempting to counter, change or negate the influence/prestige of a rival power or perceived opponent?

7. Type Government: Is the government of the second party socialist or communist?

8. Status of Government: Is the government of the second party newly established and/or in need of assistance (military, economic or political)?

The above listed variables determine if a TOFCMA is likely to be concluded and whether or not the treaty will be socialist oriented. To determine the orientation it is necessary to identify the relationships of the variables and their influence.

The Soviet Union utilizes TOFCMA's for two primary objectives: to obtain positions of political and military strength for the strengthening of their strategic and diplomatic position; and "the development of political influence and economic and military might of the world socialist system."³⁸ This is accomplished in part by the peacefulness or violence of "the present national liberation movement of the peoples...that...has become an organic integral part of world revolutionary process."³⁹

With these stated objectives of the Soviet Union, it is obvious that the classes of variables that have the most influence on a TOFCMA are perceived opponents, strategic location and government support. Table II lists the classes of variables and the relationships of the variables. A general TOFCMA evolution diagram (Fig. 1) and a socialist-oriented TOFCMA evolution diagram (Fig. 2) provide the matrix for predicting if a treaty is likely, and if so, which type is likely to be signed.

TABLE II
SOCIALIST/NON-SOCIALIST TENDENCIES
OF VARIABLES AND VARIABLE GROUPS

| Category | Non-Socialist | Socialist |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Perceived Opponent | 1. Location--near or far | 1. Location-- near |
| | 2. Relations--good or bad | 2. Relations-- bad |
| Strategic | 1. Military | 1. Military- political |
| | 2. Political | 2. Military- economic |
| | 3. Economic | 3. Political- economic |
| | | 4. Military- economic- political |
| Government Support | 1. Non-Socialist Communist | 1. New Socia- list Govern- ment |
| | 2. Socialist/ Communist Government | 2. New socia- list govern- ment re- quiring assistance |
| | 3. New Government | 3. Socialist government requiring assistance |
| | 4. Government re- quiring assis- tance | |
| Power Politics | 1. Countering In- fluence | 1. Countering Influence and Prestige |
| | 2. Countering Prestige | |
| Buffer State | 1. Not Applicable | 1. Not Applica- ble |





Figure 1. Evolution of a TOFCMA



KEY: 1 - Is "Opponent" class socialist?
 2 - Is "strategic Location" class socialist?
 3 - Is "Strategic Location" class socialist?
 4 - Is "Government" class socialist?
 5 - Is "Government" class socialist?
 6 - Socialist-oriented TOFCMA
 7 - Is "Power Politics" class socialist?
 8 - No socialist-oriented TOFCMA

Figure 2. Evolution of a Socialist-Oriented TOFCMA.

By studying Figs. 1 and 2, note that any three classes of variables can lead to a TOFCMA, but any grouping of classes containing only single variables cannot lead to a socialist-oriented TOFCMA. Only when variables of at least three classes have moved into the socialist column (Table II) will a socialist-oriented TOFCMA be concluded (Fig. 2).

In the first class of variables, perceived opponents, only a combination of the second parties' geographic location (near) and poor relations with the perceived opponent will result in a socialist-oriented TOFCMA. In the strategic location class of variables, only a combination of the variables concerning military, economic or political aspects result in a socialist-orientating factor. In the government class, only combinations of a socialist government requiring assistance, a new socialist government, or a new socialist government requiring assistance give this class a socialist orientation. Of the two final classes, only a combination of countering, changing, or negating influence and prestige in power politics results in socialist possibilities.

A state that can be a buffer state may have a socialist treaty to allow for tighter Soviet control but this is not a determining factor in a socialist/non-socialist orientation, only that a TOFCMA may be concluded.

The requirement for grouping the variables in classes to produce a socialist orientation is based on the combining of factors that together are of great importance to the Soviet

Union as cited previously regarding Soviet objectives. When utilized singly without the influence of other variables within the class, the variables tend to be of general interest only.

With these variables and classes it should be possible to predict if the conditions are suitable for a Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance and then predict its orientation and consequently the level of interest of and amount of control to be exercised by the Soviet Union.

II. ASIAN TOFCMA'S ANALYSIS

Having established the importance of treaties in the system of Soviet International Law, and reviewed the types of and phrasing in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance,* the next step is the examination of the four Asian TOFCMA's: internal problems of the Asian signatories; historical relations with the Soviet Union, changes within the Asian signatories that may have resulted due to the TOFCMA.

A. AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is one of four nations to be examined. Afghanistan exhibits the model that can be used to examine the other three nations as outlined above.

1. Problem Areas

Afghanistan is a landlocked nation that is a melting pot of Asian cultures. Because of this, the Afghan government faces numerous problems: social and cultural, economic, and security. Perhaps the most dominating problem is the social and cultural diversity of the country. Founded as an independent nation in 1747, the diverse ethnic and linguistic groups within its boundaries have prevented Afghanistan from modernizing and becoming a unified nation. With ninety per cent of the population engaged in agriculture,

*Hereafter called TOFCMA.

many of these people must move with the seasonal changes in weather, while seventeen per cent of this group belong to shifting nomadic tribes.

The ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Afghan people is marked. The languages of Afghanistan are derived from two basic sources. One source is the Indo-European family which includes Pashto, Dari, Indic, Dardic and Dravidian, with the Iranian variants of Pashto and Dari being the country's principle languages. The other source of Afghani language groups is the Ural-Altaic family. These are the Turkic languages that are spoken in northern Afghanistan which include Turkic, Uzbek and Kirghiz.

Approximately half of the population is Pastuns, speaking Pashto, an Iranian variant of the Indo-European language family, and lives in the southern regions of Afghanistan. Other major ethnic groups include the Tagiks (speaking an Iranian language derivative called Dari), Uzbeks (speaking Uzbek and Dari), Hazaras, Turkamans, Chahar Aimaks and Baluchis. Their group, language, and location are as shown in TABLE III.

While the many diverse ethnic and linguistic groups pose a major obstacle in the consolidation of a nation-state, there is a potentially greater unifying force in the Afghan religious beliefs. Ninety-nine per cent of the Afghan population belong to the Islamic faith. Eighty per cent of these Moslems belong to the Sunnis. The other twenty per cent,

TABLE III
ETHNIC/LINGUISTIC GROUPS OF AFGHANISTAN

| Ethnic Group | Language | Location | Percent of Population |
|--------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Pashtun | Pashto | South and Central | 50% |
| Tajik | Dari | Northeast | 15% |
| Uzbek | Uzbek/Dari | North Central | 15% |
| Hazara | Dari dialect | Central | 6% |
| Turkaman | Turkic | Soviet Border | 3% |
| Chahar Aimak | Dari dialect | West Central | 1% |
| Baluchi | Iranian dialect | Pakistani Border | 1% |
| Kizilbash | Dari | Central | |
| Sikhs | Indic | Major Cities | |
| Nuristani | Dardic | North Central | 9% |
| Kirghiz | Turkic dialect | Wakhan Mountains | |
| Brahui | Dravidian | South | |

Compiled from the Area Handbook for Afghanistan.

which includes most of the Hazara and Kizilbash ethnic groups and some of the Tajics, belong to the Shiite sect.

Another major problem for the Afghan government is the agricultural economy. Because of the heavy reliance on this as the primary mode of living in a harsh terrain, and only eleven inches of average annual rainfall, Afghanistan cannot rapidly modernize and industrialize. Agricultural products provide ninety per cent of Afghan exports.¹ These include, in rank of order: fresh and dried fruit and nuts, sheep skins, raw cotton, carpets and rugs, and raw wool. While these products provide a moderate source of foreign exchange, it is hardly enough to meet the needs of the nation for modernization, and is barely enough to meet the nation's survival needs.

Afghanistan is nearly self-sufficient in producing food-stuffs, with an arable land area of three per cent; when drought occurs, the country's vulnerability is very apparent. The country must import sugar, tea, fabrics, petroleum products, motor vehicles, rubber goods, machinery and chemical products.²

The need for Afghanistan to improve its agricultural production is great. The present lack of education, financial institution, ethnic diversity and lack of incentives keep the agrarian economy from providing the needed capital for modernization.

Afghan industry is based on processing agricultural products. The largest of these, the cotton textile industry, does not meet the internal needs of the country. Attempts to expand industry meet obstacles that are difficult to overcome such as: external resources that are subject to closure from Pakistan and Iran, few sources of electrical power, poor transportation, lack of transportation, lack of marketing channels and little managerial and technical skills.

Many of the problems that obstruct industrial growth are gradually met. Currently, Afghanistan is mining coal, salt, lapis lazuli and natural gas. Hydro-electric generating plants are gradually being built, but these and other industrial advances require capital which Afghanistan does not have.

While there are perils in this marginal economy, the country's vulnerability in its foreign relations is even greater. Afghanistan has historically been a nation caught in the middle of expanding empires, and it has attempted to maintain a neutral stand. Until the April 1978 coup, Afghanistan maintained a slack, non-aligned status, but with the signing of the Soviet-Afghanistan TOFCMA on December 5, 1978, the country moved into the Soviet camp.

Adding to this is a plague of problems based on ethnic unrest. The most serious area of tension is the Pashtunistan area of eastern Afghanistan which overlaps

western Pakistan; here a contest has developed over the joining Afghanistan or Pakistan rather than being divided, as it is at present. Another ethnic area that is potentially disruptive is Baluchistan, which overlaps southern Afghanistan, southwest Pakistan and southeast Iran. In both of these troubled areas are ethnic groups that are primarily nomads, using violence to obtain their needs and wants and then fleeing into a neighboring country to avoid pursuit.

2. International Security Relations

Afghanistan's policy of neutrality far antedates the events which have given rise to the term 'non-alignment.' Afghanistan has traditionally followed a policy of impartial judgment through many years, and has never deviated from this course, even during the world wars. The establishment and maintenance of friendly relations with all peoples and nations and promotion of international cooperation are important factors in our traditional political behavior.³

This was how Sardar Mohammed Daoud, Prime Minister of Afghanistan, summed up over two hundred years of Afghan foreign relations before the first summit meeting of non-aligned countries in Belgrade in September, 1961.

During the first one hundred years of its existence, the Afghan empire was consolidated and strengthened. In 1809, Dost Mohammed Khan concluded an Anglo-Afghan Treaty which was largely a British effort to cut off Russian invasion routes into India. In 1837, Dost Mohammed Khan appealed for further British aid against Iran which had

attacked Herat with Russian approval. The British refused to give him assistance because of suspected Afghan involvement in the Sikh Peshawar area. In 1838, the British invaded Afghanistan to install a pro-British ruler, thus launching the First Anglo-Afghan War which ended with the expeditionary forces being massacred in 1842.⁴

With the end of the conflict, Dost Mohammed Khan was returned to power by Great Britain. As he began to consolidate his country and unite his people, Dost Mohammed Khan was forced to maintain friendly relations with the British because of Russian ambitions in Crimea and central Asia. The Treaty of Paris, which ended the Crimean War on March 4, 1857, brought recognition of Afghanistan as an independent nation by Russia and Great Britain.⁵ The ensuing twenty years saw Russia spreading its influence to the Afghan border, but the Amir, Sher Ali, began to modernize his army, with British insistence. The Amir's leaning toward Russia led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1879) in which British forces took over the country and dictated the Treaty of Gandamak, May 16, 1879, by which the British gained the Khyber Pass and suzerainty over Afghanistan.⁶ In 1885 the Russians invaded Afghanistan north of Herat and reached a point of war with Great Britain. Conflict was averted by a border settlement between the two countries. Russia agreed to withdraw from its farthest point of advance at Zulfigar, and would be allowed to keep Panjdeh.

Russia gained the territory it wanted and Great Britain stopped the advance without a war at the expense of Afghanistan. In 1895 an Anglo-Russian Pact established the Wakhan Strip as a permanent part of Afghanistan, thus demarkating the northern tip of Afghan-Russian border⁷ to **separate** the Russian and British Indian Empires.

In 1907 Afghanistan again gained partial control of its government and partially rid itself of outside influences. On August 31, 1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention of St. Petersburg made a comprehensive settlement of Anglo-Russian differences:⁸

- a. Afghanistan became a buffer state whose integrity would be respected by both nations.
- b. Russia agreed to deal with the Amir only through Great Britain.
- c. Afghanistan was excluded from the Russian sphere of influence.

During World War I Afghanistan attempted to remain neutral but it temporized with a German mission in 1915 that sought Afghan support. While the Amir was favorable to the German viewpoint, he decided to avoid a confrontation with the British and the Russians. The rise of internal tensions, nationalism, and the desire of the new Amin, Amanullah, to divert internal discontent toward an enemy led to an Afghan attack on British forces and the Third Anglo-Afghan War, May-August 1919.⁹

This third war ended with the Treaty of Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919, and gave complete British recognition to Afghan independence and brought about a new increase in anti-British sentiment, which culminated on February 28, 1921, with the signing of an Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. Late in 1921, another treaty was signed between Afghanistan and Great Britain reaffirming Afghan independence and agreeing to the exchange of diplomats.¹⁰

During the next fifty years, Afghanistan pursued a policy of neutrality. In 1926 an Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression was signed.¹¹ During World War II Afghanistan remained neutral. In 1948 the Soviets and Afghans peacefully demarcated the last of their unmarked joint borders.¹² With the break-up of the British Indian Empire and withdrawal of British forces, the Indian subcontinent was without a major power to counterbalance Russian influence and aspirations, thus complicating Afghanistan's attempts of maintaining neutrality.

This policy of neutrality was also evident in Afghanistan's search for aid and assistance for modernization from all parts of the world. United States' aid began in 1949 with a \$21 million loan for development and reached \$350 million by 1970 when U.S. aid was drastically reduced. Soviet aid began as early as 1921 with a \$250,000 subsidy and ammunition. Soviet aid blossomed in 1950 with trade agreements and exploration agreements. Direct loans

were made by the Soviets starting in 1954. By 1955 the Soviets had loaned over \$113 million for construction of mills, silos, storage tanks, pipelines, and had given the Afghans a one-hundred bed hospital.¹⁴ Soviet aid to Afghanistan has totaled nearly \$1.5 billion between 1950 and 1978.¹⁵

In an effort to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union, Afghanistan also sought aid from other communist and non-communist sources. By the end of 1966, West German loans totaled \$54.4 million as well as grants totaling over \$3 million. Aid has also been received from Great Britain, India, Czechoslovakia, China and others.¹⁶

The most effective aid, and the most influential within Afghanistan, was military training, advisors and equipment. With the United States' reluctance to provide military assistance, Afghanistan sought and received its military aid almost entirely from the Soviet Union. This included the training of Afghan officers in the Soviet Union, general military training of the Afghan army, massive transfers of arms, technological assistance, and repair support.¹⁷

Afghanistan's neutrality shifted to a pro-Soviet stance with the April 1978 coup that installed Noor Mohammed Taraki, leader of the communist Khalq party, as head of the Afghan government. The country attempted to maintain its

neutrality, but its problems were attacked with the type of foreign aid that began to prove effective, and was supplied by the Soviet Union.

Soviet support of the Afghan government continued to grow, even as Taraki, and later Amin, espoused their continuance of the policy of neutrality. The signing of the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA on December 5, 1978, legitimized this support, particularly the military aspects as outlined in Article 4:

The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good neighbourliness, as well as the U.N. Charter, shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries.

In the interests of strengthening the defence capacity of the high contracting parties they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.¹⁸

The climax of Soviet support appears to have occurred during the December 28, 1979, coup when Soviet troops and equipment entered Afghanistan in support of the new government.

Brezhnev's statement concerning the Afghan action summed up the Soviet view:

It's a small police action designed to restore order to a country that appealed for our assistance twice before under the provisions of our friendship treaty....¹⁹

Thus the Soviets justified their actions with the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA which demonstrate a useful effect of the treaty.

3. Treaty Effects

The quantitative measurements of the effects of the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA are not available yet, but can be estimated for Afghanistan's economic and military status. The subjective views of changes can be accomplished more readily, particularly in the realm of politics and foreign affairs. In the sphere of economics, Afghanistan has received much assistance from the Soviet Union. (See Appendix C.) This assistance in the form of aid, loans, credits, gifts, technological advisors, has resulted in more than eighty projects including road building, fertilizer plants, schools, irrigation, hydro-electric and thermal power plants, airport construction, mineral exploration and exploitation, and hospital construction. Soviet economic aid has not shown any signs of change as of yet. However, since the signing of the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA, there has been no evidence of new major contributions on the part of the Soviet Union to aid the Afghan government in reaching a sound economic footing.

Another economic aspect to watch for a change is the trade figures and trade pattern between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Previously Afghanistan exported agricultural products and some minerals (primarily natural gas) to the Soviet Union and received machinery, consumer goods and petroleum products. As of December 1979, there has been no change in this pattern.

The other trade factor that could indicate a change resulting from the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA is the monetary trade balance between the two nations. As seen in Appendix C, Afghan exports to the Soviet Union have been steadily increasing, but the percentage of these exports of total Afghan exports has only increased slightly. However, imports from the Soviet Union have increased but at a slower rate, while the percentage of imports has actually declined. It is possible to estimate that the Soviet export percentage will begin to decrease for the period after the TOFCMA was signed, when the statistics become available. The imports percentage may also continue its slight decline or level off at a lower percentage rate.

The other category that is difficult to quantify at this stage in Soviet-Afghan relations is the arms trade and military expenditures. Appendix D shows these statistics and it is possible to discern some trends. While military expenditures show some fluctuation, after 1970 there has been an increasing trend in expenditures. During the same period there has also been an increase in the amount of arms sales made to Afghanistan. This follows a pattern that has been previously established to linking arms sales to a moderate control over the recipient's military expenditures.²⁰ Since the Soviet Union provided ninety-five per cent of the arms sales to Afghanistan between 1973 and 1978, this would give the Soviet Union some control over

the Afghan military budget. If Afghanistan follows the pattern concerning arms trade, statistics will show a decline in the amount of money expended on arms, with a corresponding decline in military expenditures, and an increase in the quality of arms received, as with the first time arrival of armored helicopter gunships from the Soviet Union in 1979.²¹

In addition to possible military budget control, the Soviets have also provided the military training and repairs necessary on Afghan military equipment. This gives the Soviet Union a means to influence, and possibly control, the direction of the Afghan armed forces, as was the case during the December 1979 coup, when Afghanistan's armed forces were neutralized.

The area where changes have occurred since the signing of the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA is that of politics and diplomatic support. In a press conference on May 6, 1978, Premier Taraki stated:

We are not a satellite of anyone....We are non-aligned and independent, and no country will have any justification to interfere in our internal affairs.... We will have friendly relations with any country that is prepared to offer political and economic aid to the revolutionary government.²²

Less than two years later, in the Summer of 1979, Taraki stated:

Any Afghan who ignores Russian support to his country cannot be a patriot. Love of Country demands affection for anyone supporting national development, and in that respect Russian support is more than on a friendly basis.²³

The final and most conclusive evidence of the change in Afghanistan's non-aligned status and the effect of the Soviet-Afghan TOFCMA occurred during the December 28, 1979, coup that installed Babrak Karmal as the Afghan leader. According to The Current Digest of Soviet Press, on December 28 Radio Kabul broadcasted a statement by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

The DRA government, taking into account the continuing and broadening interference and provocations by external enemies of Afghanistan and with a view to protecting the gains of the April revolution, territorial integrity and national independence and maintaining peace and security, and proceeding from the December 5, 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Co-Operation, has asked the USSR for urgent political, moral and economic assistance, including military assistance, which the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had earlier repeatedly requested from the government of the Soviet Union.²⁴

The request is supposedly based on Article 4 of the treaty which calls for appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the contracting parties.

Because of the relatively short period of time that the treaty has been in effect, it is difficult to quantitatively distinguish changes resulting from the treaty, because of the lack of empirical data. Based on previous indications from other TOFCMA's, Afghanistan appears to be following the same general pattern concerning economics and military matters. The major departure from the previous

trends is the invoking of the military clause of the treaty to allow Soviet armed forces to enter into actual combat in another country. It will be necessary to continue observations to see how this will affect Afghanistan's development.

B. INDIA

Of the four nations being examined, India is the most neutral and farthest along in its modernization program. India's prospects for the success of these programs depends on its ability to solve its internal problems.

1. Problem Areas

India is plagued with religious and ethnic unrest and has a wide variety of languages. The languages listed in Table IV except for "others," are official languages for use in state administration, as declared in the Indian Constitution, and their wide variety pose a hindrance to unification attempts.

TABLE IV
LANGUAGES OF INDIA

| <u>Language</u> | <u>% of Population</u> |
|-----------------|------------------------|
| Hindi | 30.4 |
| Tlugu | 8.6 |
| Bengali | 7.7 |
| Marathi | 7.6 |
| Tamil | 7.0 |
| Urdu | 5.3 |
| Gujarati | 4.6 |
| Kannada | 4.0 |
| Malayalam | 3.9 |
| Oriya | 3.6 |
| Punjabi | 2.5 |
| Assamese | 1.6 |
| Kashmire | 0.5 |
| Sanskrit | --- |
| Others (36) | 12.7 |

Compiled from Area Handbook for India

Although it has a large number of languages, this does not cause the government major problems. The internal ethnic problems occur primarily in Nagaland and Mizoram of western India.²⁵ Both groups have continually demanded autonomy and the right to establish an independent states. The situation produces high regional tensions that occasionally overflow into the neighboring nations of Burma and Bangladesh.²⁶

Another source of internal problems is the Moslem population. Although comprising only 11.2 per cent of the population, the Moslems of India belong to one of the three or four largest Islamic communities in the world.²⁷ Because of this large Moslem community, the Indian government must be favorably responsive to the problems of the Moslem world, particularly in the Mid-East.

Another situation that faces the Indian government is its own political instability. Indira Gandhi won re-election as Prime Minister on January 4, 1980, after being ousted from that seat thirty-three months previously. Mrs. Gandhi's platform was to put leadership and stability back into the government, from which the electorate may oust her again if she fails to act quickly. One of Mrs. Gandhi's major tasks will be to get India's economy back on solid footing. India was progressing well with its modernization programs, until a 1979 drought, along with instability within the government, caused serious setbacks

Inflation soared to 10.2% (from 0.9%). A trade deficit reappeared. Shortfalls occurred in mining, transportation and production of electricity.²⁸ These shortfalls not only hindered internal progress, they also slowed the flows of raw materials from outside sources that are needed for the modernization process.

The centerpiece of this modernization process is industrial improvement. The industry, which includes mining, quarrying, power, construction and manufacturing,²⁹ has been the object of continued attempts of expansion. These efforts have led to inadequate production caused by poor management, labor problems, obsolescence, the funneling of capital into military improvement and insufficient capital inflow from agricultural related exports. These exports, including cotton textiles, tea, leather and leather goods, coffee, tobacco and cashew kernels comprise approximately sixty per cent of India's total exports.³¹

Although one purpose of India's modernization plan is to improve the living standard of its population, the population growth is "so fast that the current technology cannot absorb the annual increment."³² The current population of 636 million is growing at an annual rate of 1.8 per cent³³ and increasingly taxes the agricultural economy as more food is required and more sources of employment are needed.

Agriculture continues to be the primary source of income for seventy per cent of India's population. Programs have been initiated to increase productivity and crop yield through management, high yield crops, irrigation projects,³⁴ but these techniques will only succeed if properly utilized. This involves educating the farmers and growers, a tremendous task. In addition to these techniques is the problem of dependence on the monsoon rains to deliver the required moisture for crop raising, and the consequential threat of floods or droughts.

India's economic problems are overshadowed by its international relations, and its attempt to champion the non-aligned movement. While purporting to remain neutral and non-aligned, India has been able to obtain much assistance from the Soviet Union, particularly in the military field.³⁵ This aid and other types of support have not aided India with its south Asian relations.

India has less success with regard to its relations with its neighbors. India maintains correct but cool relations with Nepal. Relations with Bangladesh have been warm, but there have been tensions over treatment of Bengalis in the areas around Bangladesh. Relations between India and China which have previously broken down into a border war and tensions are presently improving. The continued improvement of Sino-Indian relations are always subject to the pressures created by Chinese aid to Pakistan. Indian-Pakistani relations remained strained

because of the unsettled Kashmir issue and Pakistan's insistence on building a strong military force (including the possible development of nuclear arms) and military links with the United States.³⁶

It is because of the threat of war with Pakistan and possibly China that India has built up a formidable military force, and must continue its modernization. This necessity drains much needed capital from economic improvement programs, particularly during periods of poor economic performance, as in late 1978 and 1979. Because of this military requirement, India must also ensure that it can obtain needed supplies quickly, and turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.

2. International Security Relations

Relations with the Soviet Union have grown into a working relationship that is beneficial to both nations. After a slow beginning, due to Soviet criticisms, in the early 1950's of non-aligned and neutral states, the two nations began to express views of cordiality. In June 1955 Nehru made the first state visit of a non-communist government leader to Moscow in peacetime. This was followed by a visit to India by Krushchev in December 1955 and an endorsement of India's foreign policy.³⁷

The 1960's brought about continued increasingly friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union. Diplomatically, the Soviet Union supported India in the

United Nations Security Council on the issues arising out of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The Soviet Union sponsored the Tashkent Conference in January 1966, in an attempt to stop the fighting between India and Pakistan. While only partially successful, the Soviets were able to end that conflict in the Asian subcontinent.³⁸

In addition to the Soviet role as arbiter at Tashkent, both the Soviet Union and India supported each other during the 1960's. On September 19 and 20, 1969, PRAVDA voiced the Soviet government's appreciation for the continuation of the "policy of non-alignment and friendship with the Soviet Union," and India acknowledged the Soviet Union's help and cooperation in "economic and other matters."³⁹ Although both nations were cooperating in many areas, India still attempted to maintain a facade of neutrality. When Brezhnev proposed a collective security system for Asia, Indian Foreign Minister Singh commented in September 1969, "India welcomes the proposal....The essence of the Soviet plan is the development of cooperation among the Asian countries for the purposes of strengthening peace." In December Singh clarified the Indian position as resting on economic cooperation and not the use of major power military forces guarding the security of South Asia, especially under a military agreement.⁴⁰

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and India was enhanced on August 9, 1971, with the signing of the Soviet-

Indian TOFCMA. Measures to ensure the security of each nation are detailed in Article 9:

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to refrain from giving any assistance to any third party taking part in an armed conflict with the other party. In case either of the parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the high contracting parties shall immediately start mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for their countries.⁴¹

The immediate effect of the treaty was evident in the Bangladesh crisis that was developing between India and Pakistan, and was summarized by Henry Kissinger:

The Soviet Union...actively encouraged war by signing the Friendship Treaty, giving diplomatic support to India's maximum demands, airlifting military supplies, and pledging to veto inconvenient resolutions in the U.N. Security Council. The Soviets encouraged India to exploit Pakistan's travail in part to deliver a blow to our system of alliances, in even greater measure to demonstrate Chinese importance.⁴²

The Soviet support of the Indian position was further evidenced by Mrs. Gandhi's discussions within the Indian government:

Mrs. Gandhi also told colleagues that if the Chinese rattled the sword, the Soviets had promised to take appropriate counteraction.⁴³

Kissinger credits India, encouraged by the Soviets, as utilizing a ruthless power play to use:

The fragility of the Pakistani government and the fragility of the Pakistani political structure to force a solution of the East Pakistan crisis by military means when a political alternative seemed clearly visible.⁴⁴

The United States used the Soviet influence on India to bring an end to the conflict, and prevent a major outbreak of war between India and West Pakistan, by stationing a task force in the Indian Ocean and threatening intervention if India attacked West Pakistan.

The Soviet support of India throughout the Bangladesh crisis and India's reliance on the Soviets removed the facade of non-alignment. This shift away from neutrality caused concern to be expressed within India as to its future as a non-aligned nation. In July 1972 Professor Bhabani Sen Gupta wrote:

Taking advantage of the U.S. predicament in Southeast Asia and on the domestic front, and of the leadership crisis in China, the USSR has succeeded in bringing South Asia within the expanding orbit of its Asian sphere of influence....The U.S. virtually recognized the subcontinent as a Soviet sphere of influence.⁴⁵

He went on to say:

The fact remains that much of the recent accretion to India's influence is the result of the powerful support that it received from the U.S.S.R.⁴⁵

In the Spring of 1977, newly appointed Foreign Minister Vajpayee declared:

At one time we gave the impression that we were pro-American. Then we gave the impression we were pro-Soviet. There must be a change in which we are genuinely non-aligned.⁴⁷

The desire to regain its non-alignment is also evident in India's arms purchases. Since the early 1960's, India made

major purchases of Soviet arms (see Appendix D) and obtained licenses to produce several types of Soviet equipment:⁴⁸

a. Mig-21FL: Produced under license since 1967. Currently produces 60 per cent of aircraft.

b. Mig-21MF: Produced under license since 1972. Currently produces 60 per cent of aircraft.

c. K-13 (Atoll): Produced under license since 1967. Armament for Mig-21. India continues to purchase major new arms from the Soviet Union (KA-25 helicopters, submarines, NANUCHKA missile ships, KASHIN DDG's, ASW patrol aircraft, anti-ship missiles).

This Soviet aid continues but India is gaining additional sources for its military equipment to avoid becoming dependent on a single supplier. Most notable was the 1978 decision to purchase the Anglo-French Jaguar strike aircraft. The entire package included the outright purchase of forty aircraft, initial licensed production of sixty aircraft and purchase of an agreed proportion of spare parts and ancillary equipment. The total cost of this Jaguar deal, the largest single arms transaction in India's history, is estimated between \$1.5-\$2.0 billion.⁴⁹

Relations between the Soviet Union and India remain friendly and warm. The Soviet Union continues to offer economic (often in a timely manner in periods of economic distress in India), military aid and diplomatic support. India provides the Soviet Union with an example of friendship

and cooperation between the Soviets and an Asian neighbor for all to see. India also provides diplomatic support while attempting to maintain its non-aligned status.

3. Treaty Effects

The effects of the TOFCMA between India and the Soviet Union are several. The treaty appears to be a statement of solidarity and cooperation and the result of years of friendship and cooperation, rather than a device to be utilized for building friendship and cooperation.

There are two areas where trend changes can be fixed to the treaty. The first of these areas deals with the Indo-Soviet trade relations. While the trend of Soviet economic aid and assistance offered to India has not changed, the trends of exports and imports between the two nations has changed. The Soviet percentage of India's total annual exports (see Appendix C) increased until the treaty was signed and then began a gradual decline. The Soviet percentage of India's total annual imports remained fairly constant, except for the three year period immediately prior to the signing of the treaty when it declined slightly. These trends indicate the Soviet use of trade as a tool to gain its desires.

The other area where a change in trends is observable is military expenditures and arms trade. (See Appendix D.) Arms sales between 1964 and 1971 exhibited a steady to slightly increasing trend of monetary expenditures. After 1971 arms

sales declined until 1974 before beginning to rise again. This decline in arms sales to India also shows up in a decline of military expenditures between 1971 and 1974, again demonstrating some control by the arms seller over the recipient's military budget. At the same time that the arms trade and military expenditures were declining (after the treaty declined) India received (or was able to order) Soviet equipment of superior quality that was previously not available: Mig-21MF, Mig-23, YAK-36, Il-38, MI-8, SSN-2, SSN-9, SSN-11, SA-6, NANUCHKA missile ship, OSA PTG, KASHIN DDG.⁵⁰

Diplomatically, the Soviet-Indian TOFCMA climaxed Indo-Soviet collaboration. Within a year of the treaty signing, prominent Indian leaders and officials expressed concern about India's neutrality, and began to move the country towards a more neutral position, while at the same time ensuring the continued good relations with the Soviet Union.

In the diplomatic realm, India was one of the few nations that did not criticize the use of Soviet military forces during the December 1979 coup in Afghanistan. This support may have roots in a complex situation based on the Afghan TOFCMA and the Indian TOFCMA. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan would permit immediate support for India (under Article 9) in the event of an Indo-Pakistani war. With this support from the west, India would be able to

totally defeat Pakistan and move much closer to its ambition of unifying South Asia under Indian control. India would achieve undisputed control of Kashmir, the Indus River and would seek the establishment of a buffer area in Pakistan between itself and Soviet dominated Afghanistan.

The benefits for the Soviet Union are great. The Soviets would gain considerable influence over South Asia through its treaties with India and Afghanistan. They would be able to virtually eliminate Chinese influence in South Asia and complete the western portion of the Soviet system of Chinese containment. Most importantly, the Soviet Union would be able to control the Baluchistan region of Pakistan and gain unlimited use of the Pakistani Indian Ocean ports.

C. MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

Of the nations being studied, Mongolia has the oldest treaty of the present Soviet TOFCMA's, which was signed on January 15, 1966. Because of its earlier drafting, the Soviet Mongolian TOFCMA does not have many of the specific clauses that the newer Asian TOFCMA's have concerning conduct of relations (see Appendix B).

1. Problem Areas

The problems that face Mongolia do not include internal unrest due to ethnic and linguistic diversity. Over eighty per cent of the Mongolian population is of Mongolian ancestry. Khalkha Mongol, the standard language, is understood by nearly the entire population.⁵¹

One of the potential problem areas is that of modernization. Mongolia's economy is based on agriculture, particularly animal husbandry. As late as the late 1960's, ninety per cent of Mongolia's exports were animal products: meat, down and hair, hides and skins,⁵² while maintaining food production for internal consumption.

By being self-sufficient in food production, Mongolia is attempting to industrialize and become less dependent on agricultural products for trade. Current emphasis is being placed on the food stuffs industry (processing, preserving, canning, etc.), the light industries (textiles, woolens) and the consumer and household goods industry. The mining industry, which currently mines coal for internal consumption and gold, tungsten concentrate and fluorite for export to the Soviet Union, is projected to increase its capability and begin exploitation of other known mineral deposits which include lead, zinc, molybdenum, oil and uranium.⁵³

2. International Security Relations

While economic improvement is a continuing goal, Mongolia's most important concern is its poor relations with China, and the security-related assistance received from the Soviet Union.

In August 1978, while denouncing the PRC-Japan Peace Treaty, Mongolia's head of state, Y. Tsedenbal stated:

The MPR itself is experiencing the consequences of the great power chauvinist course of the Peking leadership. The issue involves a real threat to the independent existence of a sovereign Mongolian state. The threat comes from China, whose leaders do not hide their intention to forcibly annex Mongolia.

With justifiable indignation the Mongolian public sees in the Peking leaders' hostile anti-Vietnamese acts a copy of the impudent acts pursued by the Maoists against independent and sovereign socialist Mongolia. From stopping economic aid to concentrating troops on our border-all forms of pressure are used by the Chinese authorities in an attempt to impose their will on the freedom-loving Mongolian people.⁵⁴

Mongolia and Soviet relations began before the establishment of the Soviet Union. Before the end of the Tsarist rule, one of the last imperial treaties (The Tripartite Treaty of June 5, 1915) was signed at Kyakhta, between Russia, China and Outer Mongolia. This treaty, dealing with the autonomous status of Outer Mongolia,⁵⁵ was one of the first questions that the new Communist regime in Russia had to address. During the First World War China took advantage of Russia's European problems to gain control and dominate Mongolia until February 1921, when the Russians again assumed the dominating role.

The independence of Mongolia was declared on July 10, 1921, after being an autonomous region with Russian support since 1911. This declaration was followed by mutual recognition and a treaty of friendship with Soviet Union on November 5, 1921. During the next three years, the government structure was patterned after the Soviet Union, and was formalized on November 26, 1924 with the proclamation of the Mongolian People's Republic.⁵⁶

For the next two decades, Mongolia remained under close Soviet influence, without Chinese recognition. On March 12,

1936, the Soviet Union and Mongolia signed a Protocol Treaty on Mutual Assistance calling for various kinds of aid and armed assistance in case of threat of attack and a guarantee of the defense of Mongolia's independence.⁵⁷ This protocol permitted Soviet forces to be stationed in Mongolia. This Soviet military assistance was instrumental in the defeat of the Japanese army when it launched an attack on Mongolian outposts and border positions at Nomonkhan on May 11, 1939.⁵⁸ The treaty also provided the Soviet Union with "a valuable base for operations in Manchuria, and half the Soviet force that participated in the lightning campaign against Japan from August 8 through 20, 1945 went into Manchuria and Inner Mongolia from bases in Mongolia."⁵⁹ The country also serves as the choke point to isolate western China from Eastern China at the Kansu Corridor.

The Protocol of 1936 expired and was replaced by a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance on February 27, 1946. The provisions of the new treaty were similar to those of the Protocol, thus continuing the close defense ties with the Soviet Union that Mongolia has felt it has needed during its existence.⁶⁰

Since gaining its independence, Mongolia has feared that the Chinese would attempt to bring Mongolia back under Chinese control. During the 1930's and the 1940's, Mongolia relied solely on the USSR for economic and military aid. In January, 1946, the Kuomintang government of China

recognized the independence of Mongolia, but never exchanged ambassadors. On October 6, 1949, the People's Republic of China recognized Mongolia with a Chinese ambassador arriving in Ulan Bator in July, 1950.⁶¹

The signing of a Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and China, on February 14, 1950, brought about a decade of peaceful competition which benefited Mongolia. The Chinese began offering technical assistance and manpower for Mongolia's modernization process. Loans, in sums of 160 million rubles, then 100 million and 200 million rubles were given by the Chinese, which were followed by, respectively, loans of 300 million rubles and 615 million rubles from the USSR.⁶²

In 1962 was the highpoint in Chinese cooperation with Mongolia. Between 1955 and 1952 China was the second largest source of aid to Mongolia, behind the USSR. By 1960, 18 per cent of Mongolian exports were going to China, only ten years before Mongolian exports went solely to the USSR.⁶³ On December 26, 1962, Mongolia and China signed a border agreement that was favorable to Mongolia.⁶⁴

The breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1960's, and the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict in modern Asia, was closely followed by a breakdown of Sino-Mongolian relations and a return of the old Mongolian attitude towards China, the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance of January 15,

1966, and a return to Mongolian total reliance upon Soviet economic and military aid.

The Soviet interest in Mongolia is both strategic and economic. Historically, the Soviet Union has viewed the MPR as a buffer zone to be maintained between Soviet Central Asia and China. In February, 1945, at the Yalta conference, one of the terms agreed upon for Soviet entry into the war against Japan was the preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia. This status quo was independence and freedom from Chinese aggression.⁶⁵

The purpose of Mongolia as a buffer zone is to keep the Chinese as far as possible from the strategic vulnerable railroad system between Chita and the tip of Lake Baikal. A more significant strategic consideration develops when considering the future of central Asia, specifically the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (hereafter Sinkiang).⁶⁶

Sinkiang is a Chinese province that is wealthy in mineral resources, notably iron, coal and oil. In the vicinity of Urumchi, China has developed iron mills and coal mines and oil refineries near Kolamai, Wusu and Tushantzu. In the Tarim Basin, at the Sinkiang and Kansu province border, China has discovered oil fields and erected refineries near Yumensien and Yumen.

The importance of Sinkiang's position has also been recognized by non-Soviets as well as Soviets. In September 1948, Doak Barnett underlined the strategic importance of Peitashan which "dominates the entire Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia

border, from a strategic point of view....It flanks the Sinkiang supply line from Kansu; in non-Chinese hands, it could be a stronghold capable of severing Sinkiang from the rest of China."⁶⁷ In August, 1964, Mao Tse-tung expressed concern over possible Soviet ambitions concerning Sinkiang:

The Russians took everything they could. Some people have declared that the Sinkiang area...must be included in the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

Another major Soviet interest in Mongolia is the necessity of keeping China off-balance. This interest can be accomplished in a twofold manner. The first is the actual presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia, which have numbered an estimated three divisions since 1966.⁶⁹ The presence of these troops would be to divert Chinese troops from the Sino-Soviet border. The other method of keeping China off-balance is by means of propaganda. The primary use of propaganda against China, in the context of Mongolia, is in attempts to undermine China's position and relations with Third World nations. The ability of the Soviet Union to realize these interests is partially the result of the freedom of action that the Soviet-Mongolian TOFCMA will permit.

3. Treaty Effects

It is possible to identify two major effects of the implementation of the Soviet-Mongolian TOFCMA. The Soviet Union is the major trade partner with and economically dominates Mongolia (over ninety per cent of Mongolia's total

trade). The Mongolian trade balance has been an increasing deficit, with no change in its trend.

The other major effect of the Soviet-Mongolian treaty was to legitimize the military assistance and the presence of Soviet forces in Mongolia. The treaty (Article 5) calls on both parties to "assist each other in ensuring the defensive capacity...and in steadily strengthening the defensive power of the socialist community."⁷⁰ To this end the Soviet Union support of the Mongolian armed forces was recognized by Mongolian Defense Minister General Dorj:

Thanks to the openhearted and comprehensive assistance of our loyal friend and the reliable bulwark of peace--the great Soviet Union and its valorous armed forces, the Mongolian People's Army possesses modern weapons and combat equipment and highly trained military cadres and has become a modern army capable together with its allies of reliably defending its socialist motherland against the intrigues of aggressive forces.⁷¹

Article 5 of the treaty also calls for action consisting of "all necessary measures, including military measures,"⁷² to defend each of the contracting parties. It is because of the Mongolian fear of Chinese invasion that the Soviet Union is able to station Soviet armed forces in Mongolia.

The presence of Soviet military units in Mongolia at the present time is a result of the Chinese authorities' policies toward the Mongolian People's Republic. Ruling circles in the PRC have on more than on occasion openly stated their intention has been accompanied by practical actions which eventually brought about the present tense situation in the mutual relations between the two countries.⁷³

D. VIETNAM

Vietnam is the last of the four Asian nations with a TOFCMA to be examined. Because of the lack of reliable empirical data, due to the unrest that has occurred in Southeast Asia over the last twenty years, the analysis must be performed on insufficient data.

1. Problem Areas

In February 1974, before the Fourth Session of the National Assembly, Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi prioritized Vietnam's problems:

- (1) heal the wounds of war
- (2) restore and develop the economy and culture of the country
- (3) build the socialist material and technical base for production
- (4) consolidate the socialist relations of production
- (5) consolidate the socialist regime
- (6) stabilize the people's livelihood
- (7) consolidate national defense
- (8) strive to fulfill the North's duty to the south.⁷⁴

In April, 1974, First Secretary Le Duan expanded on the major problems that confronted Vietnam:

Our economy was shattered by the war. Weak and lopsided, it now has to meet the increasingly numerous and extensive requirements of post-war reconstruction; besides, we have shortcomings in leadership, direction and management; all this is the cause of the imbalance and fundamental weakness of our economy....Our agricultural production is uncertain and unequal in different regions; it falls short of satisfying the needs of the population, industry, agriculture and exports in food and raw materials.⁷⁵

The economic problems of Vietnam have not been solved. The necessity of "building the material and technical base for socialism and gradually to improve the living standards of the working people"⁷⁶ depends on agriculture. With eighty-five per cent of its labor force engaged in the agricultural industry, Vietnam has acutely felt the failure to meet modernization and industrialization goals because of the severe agricultural problems within the country which include natural disasters (drought, floods, pests, etc.), poor management and lack of incentives.⁷⁷ The diversion of resources to food and fertilizer, and the shortage of raw materials, has resulted in a very slow growth rate of industry.

Vietnam's economic improvement is heavily dependent upon foreign aid because of its limited ability to import technology, grain and other commodities resulting from extremely low foreign exchange reserves.⁷⁸ This aid previously came from the Soviet Union, including cancelling of all debts before August 1975, promised project aid and hard currency totalling \$5 million annually between 1976 and 1980, foodstuffs to avert famine, and Soviet financed oil from the Middle East,⁷⁹ and China, primarily in loans of \$300 million annually until 1978.⁸⁰ Chinese aid was terminated in June 1978,⁸¹ and in the same month, June 28, Vietnam joined the Communist Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON),⁸² to try to continue the flow of aid lost from China.

Vietnam's economic problems vie for contention, within the government, with another major problem, that of Vietnam's relations with the Asian neighbors. The flight of the refugees from Vietnam over the past two years has strained its relations with its neighbors, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. In peninsular Southeast Asia, the centuries-old territorial claims and animosities between the Vietnamese and Khmer peoples, and the competition for influence between Vietnam and China, has resulted in open warfare in Cambodia and threatens the peace and security of Thailand.

A major concern in Vietnam's Asian relations is its confrontation with China. Relations between Vietnam and China deteriorated after the Vietnam War. In October 1975, in Peking Le Duan refused to sign a joint communique that contained an anti-hegemony clause. Soon after this incident, the Chinese ended all grant assistance and stated they would not permit Vietnam to occupy the Spratly Islands, which are claimed by both nations.⁸⁴

Tension between Vietnam and China continued to increase into 1978. In the July 21, 1978, Peking Review, China declared:

...the Soviet superpower with its own hegemonistic aims provides cover and support for the Vietnamese authorities' regional hegemonism, while the Vietnamese authorities serve as a junior partner for the Soviet Union.⁸⁵

China also declared later that the Soviet Union was "striving to turn Vietnam into another Cuba,"⁸⁶ and began to refer to the Vietnamese as "a willing power of Soviet social-imperialism,"⁸⁷ and "the Cuba of Asia."⁸⁸ The Chinese attacked Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of friendship and co-operation as "...the 'Holy Alliance' of the global and regional hegemonists"⁸⁹ and that the Soviet treaty was actually a military pact "designated to draw these countries into its drive for world hegemony."⁹⁰

The climax of Sino-Vietnamese tensions occurred on February 19, 1979 when the Chinese began a seventeen day invasion campaign against Vietnam, to force the Vietnamese to relax their Kampuchean operations.⁹¹ Tensions remain high between Vietnam and China over their border region, the Cambodia invasion and because of Soviet influence and presence in Vietnam.

2. International Security Relations

During the first twenty years of its existence, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam maintained a careful stance between the Soviet Union and China, playing one against the other. It was not until 1975-76 that Vietnam began to move into a pro-Soviet stance.

In the 1950's Soviet aid totaled approximately half the amount that Vietnam received from China. By 1963, both the Soviet Union and China were providing approximately \$330 million each per year. As can be seen in Table V,

by 1972 the Soviets provided more than twice the aid that was provided by the Chinese.

TABLE V
USSR AND PRC AID TO VIETNAM⁹²

| Year | USSR | | PRC | |
|------|----------|--------------|----------|--------------|
| | Military | Non-Military | Military | Non-Military |
| 1970 | \$70M | \$320M | \$90M | \$70M |
| 1971 | \$100M | \$370M | \$100M | \$110M |
| 1972 | \$150M | \$350M | \$110M | \$120M |

With the movement of Vietnam into the Soviet camp, the Soviet Union increased its economic, military and diplomatic aid. Economically, the Soviet Union has provided more than five hundred million dollars in annual assistance since the end of the Vietnam war, as well as providing technology and advisors.⁹³

Soviet exports to Vietnam are designed to assist the modernization process, and include petroleum products, metals, electrical and mechanical machinery, vehicles, etc. Vietnam exports labor intensive products such as valuable woods, rice, and handicrafts. Recently the Vietnamese have begun exporting pharmaceutical products, indicating some success of utilizing imported technology from the Soviet Union.⁹⁴

Militarily the Soviet Union has continued to fulfill its obligations under Article 6 of the Soviet-Vietnamese TOFCMA:

In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries.⁹⁵

The Soviets have provided arms, assistance, training, planning and advisors to the Vietnamese armed forces. (See Appendix D.) In the first six months of 1979, the Soviet Union is estimated to have delivered approximately ninety thousand tons of material to Vietnam. Soviet support during the Chinese invasion was also indicated by the arrival of a fourteen vessel task force in the Vietnamese waters.⁹⁶

Diplomatically, the Soviet Union and Vietnam have supported each other. In 1974, the Soviets supported Vietnam in its dispute with China over the Paracel Islands.⁹⁷ The Soviet Union voiced support for Vietnam during its invasion of Cambodia during 1978 and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979.⁹⁸ Vietnam's support continues in the political realm with its latest support of Soviet actions in Afghanistan.⁹⁹

Soviet-Vietnamese relations have grown into a solid partnership of fraternal support. The Soviet Union needs the strategic position of Vietnam and Vietnam needs the economic and military assistance of the Soviet Union.

3. Treaty Effects

The effects of the Soviet-Vietnamese TOFCMA, signed on November 3, 1978, are prominently visible only in the military realm. While the treaty does serve as a focal point around

which economic and diplomatic relations revolve, there has not been any marked changes in these relations.

With regard to military assistance and presence, Vietnam's Army Chief of Staff, General Van Tien Dung stated that "the Vietnam-USSR treaty of friendship and cooperation has been developing its effect."¹⁰⁰ Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin called the visit of Soviet warships to Vietnamese ports as "a duty of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty."¹⁰¹ Both statements refer to Article 6 of the treaty that calls on consultations and appropriate measures to eliminate a threat to the security and peace of the two parties.

Another aspect of military trends that has been affected by the signing of the Vietnamese-Soviet TOFCMA is arms transfers. It is not possible to define a change in the trend of monetary expenditures for arms, but there is a definite change of quality of arms received from the Soviet Union after the treaty was signed.

Seven days after the treaty was signed, Vietnam received its first ever delivery of Mig-23's. In 1979, Vietnam received additional Mig-23's, and a first ever delivery of Mi-24 armored helicopter gunships. In 1979, the Soviet Union also offered the Vietnamese ten naval vessels, including "F" class submarines, to bolster their navy. These arms transfers and offers are of a markedly better quality than previous similar arms received by the Vietnamese from the Soviet Union.

III. CONCLUSION

A. SOVIET BENEFITS FROM TOFCMA'S

The material and data presented thus far has demonstrated the importance of treaties to the Soviet system of international law, the Soviet interpretations of the Asian TOFCMA's, the predictability of the Asian TOFCMA's and the Soviet utilization of these treaties in Asia. The benefits accrued by the Soviet Union by utilizing these treaties can be detailed through discussion of four general areas of Soviet interest in Asia: an Asian collective security system; Asian balance of power; strategic positions; Soviet prestige.

1. Asian Collective Security System

The draft of the Indo-Soviet treaty had lain for two years in a drawer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. After the announcement of Nixon's visit to China, the Soviet Union hastily concluded this treaty with India. Its aim is to realize Brezhnev's 'Asian Collective Security System,' which is directed against the countries to which Russia is hostile. But this aim is probably difficult to realize.¹

The accuracy of Chou En-lai's statement has been proven since Brezhnev proposed the Asian Security Collective System to an International Meeting of Communist and Workers Party on June 7, 1969. This proposal, as Brezhnev discussed in March 1972, included the principles of renunciation of the use of force between states,

respect for the sovereignty and existing borders of states, non-interference in internal affairs, and cooperation in economic and other fields. Details of the plan, as outlined by IZVESTIA, described the plan as a defensive measure to safeguard the independence of Asian countries against "imperialist aggression and neo-colonialism."² Further details of the plan were revealed to Pakistan's Yahya Khan by the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan in the summer of 1969,³ which included such actions as:

- a. parties would not enter into any alliance with a third country that might be hostile to any member countries;
- b. parties would not make commitments inconsistent with the security plan;
- c. parties will consult each other in case of aggression by a third party.

Brezhnev's proposal was not well received by most of the Asian nations. China, when denouncing the proposal, charged that the plan was picked up from the "garbage heap of the notorious warmonger John Foster Dulles."⁴ India desired to maintain its purported non-aligned status by avoiding military alliances. The Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan stated:

Afghanistan has never had and will not wish to have desire of joining any military and defensive pact under whatever name it may be formed.⁵

With the failure of the collective security proposal, the Soviet Union sought a new device to cloak the construction

of such system. It fell upon the Asian TOFCMA system to fill this need. It is important to note that all of the principles and details of the security system previously cited are included in the treaties examined (see Appendix B), except for the Mongolian treaty which predated the collective security proposal.

Of special interest is Afghanistan's change of position with regard to an Asian collective system. The Soviet-Afghan treaty is the only Asian TOFCMA that specifically calls for "the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent" (Article 8), while Indian and Vietnamese TOFCMA's do not mention any security system.

2. Asian Balance of Power

The second area of Soviet interest in Asia is the Asian balance of power. The primary objective of this Soviet interest is the countering of perceived Chinese aspirations. In the diplomatic realm, this includes providing verbal support to its treaty partners during their confrontations with China. This support accounts for the continuous propaganda that accuses China of desires to annex Mongolia. The Soviets supported India over the Kashmir issue and during the Bangladesh crisis while China supported Pakistan. The Soviet Union denounced the Chinese invasion of Vietnam during February, 1979.

A geographic effort by the Soviet Union against China is that country's objective to contain and encompass China with pro-Soviet nations. The Soviet Union is building a wall of such governments with the Asian TOFCMA's, and is nearly complete to the west of China with the South Asian TOFCMA's with Afghanistan and India.

Further Soviet desires in the balance of power game is the reduction of Chinese influence. The Asian TOFCMA's do not signify the beginning of an effort to reduce Chinese influence, but are the culmination of Soviet efforts along this line. As in the case of India, such efforts will probably not keep Chinese influence out of a country, but will probably keep such influence that may arise from becoming important or usable against the Soviet Union.

The final efforts of the Soviet Union to alter the Asian balance of power in its favor is by building up the Asian TOFCMA signatories' military forces and capabilities. The signing of an Asian TOFCMA generally climaxes a series of massive arms sales by the Soviet Union. This trade builds some control over the military budget of the other nations. After a treaty is signed, arms transfers continue to arrive from the Soviet Union, but in smaller quantities in terms of money spent.⁶

The significant change in arms transfers between the Soviet Union and the Asian signatories of the TOFCMA's is the superior quality of the arms received after a treaty

is signed. This superior quality is marked by the introduction of a newer, more capable model of armament previously received, or the introduction of armament never previously received. Afghanistan received the Mig-21MF fighter, the Mi-24 armored helicopter gunship and the PT-76 tank. India received Mig-23 fighters, Il-38 ASW aircraft, SSN-2/9/11 missiles, missile ships, and licensed production rights for the Mig-21MF. Vietnam received Mig-23 fighters and the Mi-24 helicopter gunship.⁷

The Soviet Union supports all the Asian signatories with military aid, assistance, advisors, and training and support. Military advisors were in Vietnam for several weeks prior to the launching of the Cambodian offensive. Mongolia utilizes its TOFCMA (Article 5) to ensure the presence of Soviet forces to deter possible Chinese aggression. All four nations utilize the treaty to justify the support received from the Soviet Union, whether material, actual troops, or the presence of Soviet forces in a non-belligerent status, as with Soviet naval port visits to India and Vietnam.⁸

3. Strategic Positions

The Soviet Union also desires to obtain and maintain close relations with those nations that occupy a strategic military position. One aspect of strategic positioning is the possibility of acting as a buffer state for the Soviet Union's security system. Mongolia and Afghanistan have historically performed this task, with Afghanistan only

recently becoming the near equivalent of a Soviet satellite nation.

With regard to strategic world locations, the Asian partners of the TOFCMA system all occupy priority areas. Afghanistan is next to Iran and within easy flying distance to the Persian Gulf. India can control major shipping lanes throughout the Indian Ocean, offers refueling and repair facilities for Soviet aircraft and is directly beneath China. Mongolia forms a major portion of the northern border of China. Vietnam is on China's southeast border, and has excellent maritime facilities that can be utilized by the Soviet navy. Vietnam occupies a position on the major trade routes of China and Japan with the rest of the world, and offers an excellent observation position over that entire region of the world.

4. Soviet Prestige

The last major area of interest that the Soviets hope to enhance with the Asian TOFCMA's is Soviet prestige and influence in Asia, and the world. This enhancement is attempted primarily through economic aid and assistance.

Soviet aid and assistance tends to generally be showcase aid. The Soviets help the signatory nations build factories, power plants, transportation facilities, and mining and processing plants that are high visible. While these projects assist the modernization processes of the Asian TOFCMA signatories, they are also projects

that the Soviets can point to when they desire to impress other Asian states.⁹

Another aspect of Soviet aid that should be noted is the quickness of Soviet response. When an aid agreement is signed, the Soviet Union will begin to fulfill that agreement when the other nation is ready. Also, when a disaster occurs, the Soviet Union responds quickly with requested aid to its Asian TOFCMA partners.

B. SUMMATION

The Asian TOFCMA's that have been examined provide the Soviet Union with important aspects of its foreign policy. The examination of data and trends in this thesis has highlighted the effects of a TOFCMA on relations between the Soviet Union and the four Asian countries examined. These trends and effects indicated that these treaties do provide the Soviet Union with a valuable asset for the conduct of its relations in Asia.

For the discussions presented above, a study of other Asian nations, and examination of the trends that correspond to those identified, it is possible to theorize the extent to which the Soviet Union could expand its system of Treaties of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance. In terms of the TOFCMA system, the following might or might not occur with these Asian nations:

1. Afghanistan

The present TOFCMA is the only treaty that has a clause permitting early termination of the treaty. When the current crisis subsides, the new Afghan government will look to the Soviet Union for massive support. This support will provide leverage for the Soviets to have the present treaty cancelled and a new treaty of socialist orientation (more binding) signed. This event could occur within the next two years.

2. Bangladesh

Bangladesh is a prime candidate for a non-socialist treaty, similar to India's.

3. Bhutan

No treaty will be concluded in the near future.

4. Burma

Burma fits the flow diagram to obtain a treaty, possibly socialist oriented.

5. Cambodia

If the current situation resolves itself into a stable pro-Soviet government, a socialist oriented treaty is likely to be concluded.

6. China

No treaty. The 1950 TOFCMA was cancelled by China on April 3, 1979.

7. Japan

No treaty.

8. India

The current treaty will remain in effect.

9. Indonesia

No treaty.

10. North Korea

Current TOFCMA of 1961 will remain ineffect.

11. South Korea

No treaty.

12. Laos

A socialist oriented treaty similar to Vietnam's could be concluded within the next two years.

13. Malaysia

No treaty in the immediate future, but there exists the possibility of a non-socialist oriented treaty if Soviet-Malaysian relations continue to improve.

14. Mongolia

The present treaty will remain in effect until the mid-1980's when it will probably be replaced with a newer version of a socialist oriented treaty, similar to Vietnam's.

15. Nepal

No treaty in the immediate future.

16. Pakistan

No treaty.

17. Philippines

No treaty.

18. Sri Lanka

A non-socialist oriented treaty is possible within the next four to five years.

19. Thailand

No treaty.

20. Vietnam

Present treaty will remain in effect.

The dynamic potentialities of the Soviet Asian TOFCMA system are really apparent when reviewing the various Asian nations that could be included with a TOFCMA. Bangladesh could provide maritime facilities and an opportunity to lessen Chinese influence in the South Asian region. Burma and Laos could become additional blocks in the wall to contain China as well as being areas to counter Chinese influence. Malaysia is strategically located on choke points of major shipping lanes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Sri Lanka is strategically located to permit complete naval and air coverage of the Indian Ocean and countering the influence of the Chinese. North Korea provides the Soviet Union with a nation to buffer the Soviet Union from China. The Soviet-Korean TOFCMA was not discussed in this thesis as it is essentially a mutual defense arrangement similar to the Soviet-Mongolian TOFCMA which it predates.

These Asian TOFCMA's encompass the Soviets' Asian collective security desires without being a military alliance. The treaties legitimize the Soviet's assistance and presence

in support of the armed forces of the Asian signatories. These treaties are part of a Soviet system to exhibit and demonstrate Soviet prestige and "willingness" to befriend third world nations.

The flexibility of the Asian TOFCMA system permits the Soviet Union to choose the options of actions that fit the needs of the Soviet Union, while at the same time offering inducements to its present and future TOFCMA partners to ensure their cooperation with the Soviet Union. The vagueness of the clauses of the individual treaties permits the Soviet Union and the other signatory to interpret the TOFCMA and take actions that are in their own best interests.

The Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance in Asia is an advantageous tool for the foreign policy decision-makers of the Soviet Union. It gives them the capability and flexibility needed to pursue the Soviet Union's aims and desires in Asia. It legalizes and legitimizes many Soviet actions with its treaty partners. This legalization of the Soviet actions poses problems for U.S. foreign policy decision-makers, and thus makes it necessary to understand and correctly interpret the content, context and intention of each Asian Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance, current and future ones.

APPENDIX A

TERM/PHRASE INTERPRETATION

| <u>Term/Phrase</u> | <u>Interpretation</u> |
|---|--|
| 1. Democracy | 1. Following Soviet ideals. |
| 2. Fraternal | 2. In the interest of the Soviet Union. |
| 3. Co-Operation | 3. U.S.S.R. assists other states and brings them closer to the Soviet camp. |
| 4. Non-Alignment | 4. States do not attack nor permit attacks nor form alliances against the U.S.S.R. |
| 5. Liberation Movements | 5. Fight against imperialism and capitalist enslavers. |
| 6. Imperialism | 6. Conduct of a string capitalist state. |
| 7. Support for Independence and National Sovereignty | 7. States should have free will and support the U.S.S.R. |
| 8. National Resource Sovereignty | 8. States control own resources and give U.S.S.R. priority access to them. |
| 9. Defend Socialist Gains | 9. All parties ensure socialist/communist government and social systems remain pro-Soviet. |
| 10. Exchange of Opinion | 10. U.S.S.R. insures all states support U.S.S.R. and its desires. |
| 11. Broaden Mutual Acquaintenance of Life, Work, etc. | 11. U.S.S.R. attempts to brings about socialism/communism. |
| 12. Peace-Loving Foreign Policy | 12. Use of peaceful means to support U.S.S.R. policy outside own state, utilizing force when peaceful actions do not obtain desired result. |
| 13. Peaceful Co-Existence | 13. Peace policy, absence of violent struggle while preparing for advance of communism. |
| 14. World Peace and Security | 14. Soviet peace and security, non-military phase of protracted conflict. |
| 15. One-Mindedness | 15. Following Soviet policies. |
| 16. Mutual Defense | 16. U.S.S.R. can give military aid and enter country with military personnel and equipment. |
| 17. Increase Defense Capability | 17. States use Soviet military equipment and become dependent on Soviet military supplies. |
| 18. Disarmament | 18. Divert attention from security problems and weaken hostile military forces. |
| 19. Co-Operation | 19. U.S.S.R. provide assistance, funds, and material (if necessary) to improve other states' economic and social standards; other states provide U.S.S.R. items needed and any western technology in its possession or imported. |

STIPULATIONS OF TREATIES

| STIPULATIONS | AFGHANISTAN | INDIA | MONGOLIA | VIETNAM |
|---|-------------|-------|----------|---------|
| Friendship | P,1 | 1 | | 1 |
| Fraternal Friendship | | | P | 1 |
| Non-Alignment Policy | 5 | 4 | | |
| Soviet Peaceful Foreign Policy | 5 | 4 | | |
| Anti-Imperialism | | | 7 | 5 |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Anti-Colonialism | 9 | 3 | 6 | 5 |
| Anti-Racialism | 9 | 3 | | 5 |
| Support for Nations Seeking Sovereignty and Independence | P,9 | 1 | | |
| Non-Interference - Internal Affairs | 1 | 1 | | |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Non-Interference - International Affairs | | | | 1 |
| National Resource Sovereignty | | | | 5 |
| World Peace | P | 2 | P | 5 |
| Asian Peace | P | 2 | P | P |
| African Peace | | | | 5 |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| General Disarmament | 7 | 2 | 6 | |
| Nuclear Disarmament | 7 | 2 | | |
| Mutual Assistance If Threatened/Attacked | | 9 | | 6 |
| Co-Operation in Military Field | 4 | | 5 | |
| Increase Defense Capabilities | 4 | | 5 | |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Not Permit Territory For Military Aggression | | 5 | | |
| No Alliance Against Other Party | 6 | 8 | | |
| No Action Against Other Party | 6 | 8 | | |
| No Conflict With Other Treaties | 11 | 10 | 8 | 7 |
| Make No Conflicting Treaties | 11 | 10 | | |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Exchange Opinions on International Affairs | 10 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| Questions Concerning This Treaty Mutually Discussed | 12 | 12 | | |
| Defend Socialist Gains | | | P,1,5 | 4 |
| Facilitate Development and Co-Operation in Arts, Culture, etc. | 3 | 7 | 3 | 3 |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Exchange Study of Lifestyles | 3 | | | 3 |
| Develop Social Gains | 3 | | 1 | |
| Develop Economic Gains | 2 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| Develop National Economy | 2 | 6 | | 2 |
| Most Favored Nation Treatment | 2 | 6 | | |
| Co-Operation in Agriculture | 2 | | | 2 |
| Co-Operation in Communication | 2 | 6 | | |
| Co-Operation in Economics | 2 | 6 | P | 2 |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Co-Operation in Energy | 2 | | | |
| Co-Operation in Industry | 2 | | | 2 |
| Co-Operation in Natural Resources | 2 | | | |
| Co-Operation in Science | 2 | 6 | | 2 |
| Co-Operation in Transportation | 2 | 6 | | 2 |
| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Ratification | 15 | 11 | 9 | 8 |
| Period* | 13 | 11 | 10 | 9 |
| Extension** | 13 | 11 | 10 | 9 |

NOTES:

P - Preamble

Numerals - Article Number

*Afghanistan: 20 years

India: 20 years

Mongolia: 20 years

Vietnam: 25 years

**All extensions automatic for the period indicated, unless notice is given of intention to cancel.

Afghanistan: 5 years

India: 5 years

Mongolia: 10 years

Vietnam: 10 years

TRADE/AID/CREDIT WITH USSR (\$US-MILLION)

| YEAR | Afghanistan | | | A ¹ | India | | | A ² |
|------|-------------|-----------|-------|----------------|------------|------------|-------|----------------|
| | E (%) | I (%) | B | | E (%) | I (%) | B | |
| 1963 | 21.2 (31) | 63.7 (51) | -42.5 | 47.7 | 109.1 (7) | 143.8 (6) | -34.7 | |
| 1964 | 22.5 (32) | 65.1 (46) | -42.6 | 46.2 | 165.6 (10) | 165.4 (6) | -1.8 | |
| 1965 | 17.5 (26) | 60.9 (47) | -43.4 | 42.8 | 195.1 (12) | 174.8 (6) | +20.3 | |
| 1966 | 21.5 (33) | 80.6 (53) | -59.1 | | 259.1 (11) | 238.9 (5) | +20.2 | |
| 1967 | 22.5 (33) | 66.5 (48) | -44.0 | | 169.3 (11) | 144.8 (5) | +24.5 | |
| 1968 | 25.6 (36) | 47.8 (38) | -22.2 | 33.8 | 185.1 (11) | 169.1 (8) | +16.3 | |
| 1969 | 31.2 (38) | 42.2 (33) | -11.0 | 29.3 | 221.4 (12) | 274.1 (13) | -52.7 | |
| 1970 | 32.5 (38) | 37.5 (34) | -5.0 | 10.0 | 271.1 (13) | 164.9 (8) | 106.2 | |
| 1971 | 58.6 (39) | 40.3 (24) | -1.7 | 14.7 | 281.0 (14) | 102.9 (4) | 178.1 | |
| 1972 | 36.1 (29) | 13.5 (14) | +22.6 | | 367.8 (15) | 102.7 (5) | 265.1 | |
| 1973 | 48.8 (31) | 78.4 (14) | +30.4 | | 389.6 (13) | 119.9 (4) | 269.7 | |
| 1974 | 92.4 (4) | 73.3 (30) | +19.1 | | 469.9 (12) | 192.2 (10) | -22.3 | |
| 1975 | na | na | na | 437.0 | 509.4 (12) | 258.2 (4) | 251.2 | |
| 1976 | na | na | na | | na | na | na | |

| YEAR | Mongolia | | | A ³ | Vietnam | | | A ⁴ |
|------|----------|-------|--------|----------------|---------|-------|--------|----------------|
| | E | I | B | | E | I | B | |
| 1963 | 51.7 | 114.0 | -62.3 | | 35.3 | 56.7 | -21.2 | |
| 1964 | 57.4 | 140.9 | -83.5 | | 34.8 | 47.7 | -12.9 | |
| 1965 | 61.9 | 126.8 | -64.9 | | 30.6 | 74.9 | -44.3 | |
| 1966 | 62.3 | 158.0 | -95.7 | | 25.3 | 67.9 | -42.6 | |
| 1967 | 62.1 | 186.4 | -124.3 | | 20.9 | 147.7 | -126.8 | |
| 1968 | 53.1 | 193.9 | -140.8 | | 17.8 | 159.2 | -141.4 | |
| 1969 | 52.8 | 196.2 | -143.4 | | 16.9 | 189.3 | -172.4 | |
| 1970 | 58.9 | 198.1 | -139.7 | | 18.6 | 185.0 | -166.4 | 320 |
| 1971 | 79.4 | 182.0 | -107.6 | | 23.9 | 154.8 | -130.9 | 370 |
| 1972 | 92.9 | 253.6 | -160.7 | | 27.3 | 113.6 | -86.3 | 350 |
| 1973 | 119.4 | 340.4 | -221.0 | | 50.1 | 194.1 | -144.0 | |
| 1974 | 157.4 | 376.9 | -219.5 | | 57.4 | 254.1 | -196.7 | |
| 1975 | 173.7 | 492.2 | -318.5 | | 66.3 | 220.0 | -153.7 | |
| 1976 | 185.4 | 629.8 | -444.4 | | 84.4 | 308.5 | -224.1 | |
| 1977 | na | na | na | | na | na | na | |
| 1978 | na | na | na | | 205.0 | 409.0 | 0204.0 | 500 |

- NOTES: E = Exports to USSR
 I = Imports from USSR
 B = Trade Balance with USSR
 A = Aid/Credit/Loans Received During Year (not including military) from USSR
 (%) = Percentage of World Trade
 na = Not Available
 * = Data not available to determine percentage of world trade. Estimates place USSR/Mongolian trade at 85%-90% of Mongolia's total trade.
 1 = Afghanistan was recipient of Soviet aid throughout the period covered, but this aid is difficult to quantify although it was estimated to be at \$1.5 billion by 1975.
 2 = India has received aid totaling over \$1 1/4 billion through 1975. India continues to receive aid and assistance to the present.
 3 = Mongolia receives steady aid, assistance and grants from USSR yearly, but actual figures are not available.
 4 = The figures for Vietnam are estimates on aid with a \$1.5 billion agreement for the next five years.

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics for Years 1968-1976. New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations.

Notes: Figures are from the yearbook, except for percentages (which are derived from yearbook data) and Aid/Credit/Loans.

APPENDIX D

ARMS TRADE AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE (US \$-MILLIONS)

AFGHANISTAN

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Military Expenditure (ACDA)</u> | <u>Military Expenditure (SIPRI)</u> | <u>Arms Trade (ACDA)</u> | <u>Major Purchases</u> |
|-------------|--|---|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1963 | 8.4 | -- | 38.9 | T-54, I1-14 |
| 1964 | 12.9 | 46.5 | 42.3 | T-54, Mig-19 |
| 1965 | 14.4 | 44.4 | 48.7 | Mig-19, Mi-4 |
| 1966 | 14.8 | 43.3 | 40.7 | Mig-21 |
| 1967 | 15.9 | 37.3 | 32.9 | SA-2, Mig-21 |
| 1968 | 34.0 | 31.4 | 51.5 | Mig-21 |
| 1969 | 34.0 | 34 | 48.3 | -- |
| 1970 | 29.3 | 30 | 34.8 | Mig-21 |
| 1971 | 26.1 | 29 | 22.2 | Mi-8 |
| 1972 | 30.9 | 29 | 21.4 | SU-7 |
| 1973 | 33.2 | 39 | 79.9 | Helos, APC |
| 1974 | 30.1 | 38 | 82.3 | Helos, Tanks |
| 1975 | 38.0 | 45 | 41.9 | |
| 1976 | 36.4 | 60 | 39.6 | |
| 1977 | 42.7 | 53 | 45.1 | |
| 1978 | na | na | na | Mig-21MF |
| 1979 | na | na | na | Mi-9/24, PT-76 |

NOTE: During the period covered, the USSR supplied approximately 92% of the arms sold to Afghanistan.

APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

INDIA

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Military Expenditure (ACDA)</u> | <u>Military Expenditure (SIPRI)</u> | <u>Arms Trade (ACDA)</u> | <u>Major Purchases</u> |
|-------------|--|---|------------------------------|--|
| 1963 | 1772.4 | 2055 | 272.4 | Mig-21 |
| 1964 | 1797.0 | 2011 | 180.4 | PT-76 |
| 1965 | 1813.8 | 1961 | 189.5 | SA-2, PT-76, Mi-4, Mig-21 |
| 1966 | 1639.8 | 1852 | 376.8 | LST, AN-12, SA-2, Mig-21 |
| 1967 | 1610.2 | 1718 | 132.7 | Mig-21, TU-124 |
| 1968 | 1610.7 | 1788 | 219.2 | F SUB, T-55, SU-7B |
| 1969 | 1649.5 | 1892 | 170.2 | T-55, SU-7B, F SUB Frigates |
| 1970 | 1748.4 | 1949 | 115.6 | T-55, SU-7B, F SUB |
| 1971 | 2110.9 | 2320 | 264.4 | T-55, SU-7B, Mi-8 SSN-2 |
| 1972 | 2054.7 | 2449 | 221.6 | SSN-2, Mig-21M/MF, Frigates |
| 1973 | 1765.1 | 2165 | 170.2 | F SUB, Mig-21M |
| 1974 | 1874.3 | 2014 | 173.3 | YAK-36, Mig-21M, LST, F SUB, SSN-9 |
| 1975 | 2286.6 | 2266 | 141.7 | F SUB, NANUCHKA, OSA, SA-6, I1-38, Mig-21M |
| 1976 | 2269.2 | 2660 | 245.4 | SSN-11, SSN-2, KASHIN, F SUB, KA-25, Mig-21Bis |
| 1977 | 2311.2 | 2584 | 345.1 | SSN-11, I1-38, Mig-21M |
| 1978 | na | 2864 | na | SSN-11, Mig-21M |
| 1979 | na | na | na | Mig-21M |

- NOTE: 1. Arms trade supplied by USSR: 1963-1973: 59%
1973-1977: 85.1%
2. India has contracted for Mig-23 (possible 50),
probably in 1974.
3. India has received T-72 tanks, date of delivery
unknown.

APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

MONGOLIA

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Military Expenditure (ACDA)</u> | <u>Military Expenditure (SIPRI)</u> | <u>Arms Trade (ACDA)</u> |
|-------------|--|---|------------------------------|
| 1963 | 21.1 | 18 | na |
| 1964 | 21.1 | 18 | na |
| 1965 | 21.1 | 18 | na |
| 1966 | 20.1 | 18 | na |
| 1967 | 26.4 | 24 | na |
| 1968 | 31.7 | 30 | na |
| 1969 | 40.2 | 38 | na |
| 1970 | 42.3 | 44 | na |
| 1971 | 45.5 | 50 | na |
| 1972 | 50.7 | 57 | na |
| 1973 | 52.9 | 63 | 10 |
| 1974 | na | 110 | 10 |
| 1975 | na | 111 | 20 |
| 1976 | na | 121 | 20 |
| 1977 | na | 120 | 30 |
| 1978 | na | 120 | na |
| 1979 | na | na | na |

- NOTE:
1. All figures are estimates.
 2. All arms trade is with USSR.
 3. Mongolia's military forces are equipped and heavily supported by the Soviet army.
 4. Known armament in Mongolian forces includes T-54 tanks, PT-76 tanks, Mig-15's. It is likely that more modern equipment has been transferred to the Mongolian army.

APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

VIETNAM

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Military Expenditure (ACDA)</u> | <u>Military Expenditure (SIPRI)</u> | <u>Arms Trade (ACDA)</u> | <u>Major Purchases</u> |
|-------------|--|---|------------------------------|--|
| 1963 | 360.4 | 485 | 10.0 | Mi-4, Mig-17 |
| 1964 | 426.0 | 585 | 35.5 | Mi-4, Mig-15/17, Gunboat |
| 1965 | 446.1 | 620 | 376.2 | PT-76, Mig-15/17, Gunboat |
| 1966 | 447.1 | 640 | 616.8 | PT-76, Mig-15/17/21, Gunboat |
| 1967 | 427.0 | 630 | 853.7 | PT-76, Mig-15/17/21, SA-2, Il-28, Gunboat |
| 1968 | 410.1 | 630 | 671.2 | Mig-17/21, SA-2, Il-28 |
| 1969 | 361.5 | 585 | 389.4 | SA-2, Mig-17/21 |
| 1970 | 342.5 | 585 | 321.1 | SA-2, AN-2, T-54, Mig-17/21 |
| 1971 | 327.7 | 585 | 341.1 | SA-2, T-54, Mig-17/21 |
| 1972 | 343.5 | 635 | 819.2 | SSN-2, SA-2/7, Gunboat, Komar, T-54, Mig-17/21 |
| 1973 | 290.7 | 565 | 269.9 | |
| 1974 | na | 565 | 201.0 | Tanks |
| 1975 | na | 605 | 108.4 | SA-9 |
| 1976 | na | na | 39.6 | SSN-2, T-62, SA-7 |
| 1977 | na | na | 7.1 | |
| 1978 | na | na | na | Mig-23 |
| 1979 | na | na | na | Mig-23, Mi-24, Massive arms |

NOTE: 1. Military Expenditures (SIPRI) are estimates.
 2. In early 1979, Vietnam received a massive influx of Soviet arms to counter the Chinese invasion. The USSR also offered ten naval vessels, including "F" class submarines to the Vietnamese navy.

APPENDIX D General Notes:

1. All figures are US \$-million at 1973 constant rates.
2. ACDA refers to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agencies yearbooks entitled, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers."
3. SIPRI refers to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's yearbooks on arms trade.

APPENDIX E

SOVIET-AFGHAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, GOOD-NEIGHBORLINESS AND CO-OPERATION (TREATY TEXT)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,

Reaffirming their commitment to the aims and principles of the Soviet-Afghan treaties of 1921 and 1931, which laid the basis for friendly and goodneighbour relations between the Soviet and Afghan peoples and which meet their basic national interests.

Willing to strengthen in every way friendship and all-round cooperation between the two countries.

Being determined to develop social and economic achievements of the Soviet and Afghan peoples, to safeguard their security and independence, to come out resolutely for the cohesion of all the forces fighting the peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.

Expressing their firm determination to facilitate the strengthening fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation in Asia, attaching great importance to the further consolidation of the contractual-legal basis of their relations.

Reaffirming their dedication to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighbourliness and Cooperation and agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare their determination to strengthen and deepen the inviolable friendship between the two countries and to develop all-round cooperation on the basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty, territorial, integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 2

The high contracting parties shall make efforts to strengthen and broaden mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation between them. With these aims in view, they shall develop and deepen cooperation in the fields of industry, transport

and communications, agriculture, the use of national resources, development of the power-generating industry and other branches of economy, to give each other assistance in the training of national personnel and in planning the development of the national economy. The two sides shall expand trade on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and most-favoured nation treatment.

Article 3

The high contracting parties shall promote the development of cooperation and exchange of experience in the fields of science, culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, sport, and other fields.

The two sides shall facilitate the expansion of cooperation between organs of state power and public organizations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions with a view to making a deeper acquaintance of the life, work experience and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 4

The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good neighbourliness, as well as the U.N. Charter, shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries.

In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the high contracting parties they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.

Article 5

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of nonalignment which is pursued by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and which is an important factor for maintaining international peace and security.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan respects the policy of peace pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.

Article 6

Each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not join any military or other alliances or take part in any groupings of states, as well as in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 7

The high contracting parties shall continue to make every effort to defend international peace and the security of the peoples, to deepen the process of relaxation of international tension, to spread it to all areas of the world, including Asia, to translate it into concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation among states and to settle international disputed issues by peaceful means.

The two sides shall actively contribute toward general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Article 8

The high contracting parties shall facilitate the development of cooperation among Asian states and the establishment of relations of peace, goodneighbourliness and mutual confidence among them and the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent.

Article 9

The high contracting parties shall continue their consistent struggle against machinations by the forces of aggression, for the final elimination of colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations.

The two sides shall cooperate with each other and with other peaceloving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for their freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress.

Article 10

The high contracting parties shall consult with each other on all major international issues affecting the interests of the two countries.

Article 11

The high contracting parties state that their commitments under the existing international treaties do not contradict the provisions of the present treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

ARTICLE 12

Questions which may arise between the high contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of any provision of the present treaty, shall be settled bilaterally, in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect.

ARTICLE 13

The present treaty shall remain in force within twenty years of the date it becomes effective. Unless one of the high contracting parties declares six months before the expiration of this term of its desire to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force for the next five years until one of the high contracting parties warns in writing the other party, six months before the expiration of current five-year term, about its intention to terminate the treaty.

ARTICLE 14

If one of the high contracting parties expresses the wish in the course of the twenty-year term of the treaty to terminate it before its expiration date, it shall notify in writing the other party, six months before its suggested date of expiration of the treaty, about its desire to terminate the treaty before the expiration of the term and may consider the treaty terminated as of the date thus set.

ARTICLE 15

The present treaty shall be ratified and take effect on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is to take place in Kabul.

Done in duplicate, each in the Russian and Dari languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow on December 5, 1978.

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic

L. Brezhnev.

For the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan

N. Mohammad Taraki.

Source: Foreign Broadcast Information Services: USSR,
December 6, 1978, pp. J10-J13.

APPENDIX E

SOVIET-INDIAN TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION

Wishing to expand and strengthen the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

considering that the further development of friendship and cooperation meets the basic national interests of both states as well as the interests of a lasting peace in Asia and throughout the world,

being determined to contribute to strengthening world peace and security and to work tirelessly to bring about a relaxation of international tension and the final abolition of the remnants of colonialism.

reaffirming their firm belief in the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between states with different political and social systems,

convinced that in the present-day world international problems can be solved only through cooperation and not through conflict,

reaffirming their determination to follow the objectives and principles of the United National Charter.

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one hand, and the Republic of India, on the other, have decided to conclude the present Treaty and with this aim in view have appointed the following plenipotentiaries:

on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--the Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. A. A. Gromyko,

on behalf of the Republic of India--the Minister of External Affairs of India Swaran Singh,

who, upon presentation of their credentials, found in due form and proper order, agreed on the following:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that there shall be a lasting peace and friendship between their two countries and their peoples. Each shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other Party. The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and strengthen the relations of sincere friendship, good-neighbourliness and all-round cooperation existing between them, on the basis of the above-mentioned principles as well as the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

Article 2

Guided by a desire to contribute in every way towards ensuring a lasting peace and the security of their peoples, the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue efforts towards maintaining and strengthening peace in Asia and throughout the world, ending the arms race and achieving general and complete disarmament covering both nuclear and conventional weapons under effective international control.

Article 3

Guided by their devotion to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and states, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racism in all forms and manifestations and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete abolition.

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other states in achieving these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

Article 4

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy is an important factor for maintaining universal peace and international security and for easing tension in the world.

The Republic of India respects the peaceful policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all peoples.

Article 5

Being deeply interested in ensuring world peace and security, and attaching great importance to mutual cooperation in the international arena to achieve these aims, the High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both states, through meetings and exchanges of opinion between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special representatives of the two governments, and through diplomatic channels.

Article 6

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technical cooperation between them, the High Contracting Parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutually advantageous and all-round cooperation in these fields and also to expand their cooperation in the fields of trade, transport and communications on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and the most favoured nation principle in compliance with the existing agreements and special agreements with neighbouring countries, as it is stipulated in the trade agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and India of December 26, 1970.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties shall promote the further development of the relations and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, health care the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and spirit.

Article 8

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliances directed against the other Party.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from any aggression against the other party and not to allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to the other High Contracting Party.

Article 9

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from giving any assistance to any third Party taking part in an armed conflict with the other Party. In the event that any of the Parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately start mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for their countries.

Article 10

Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any commitments, secret or open, with regard to one or more states incompatible with the present Treaty. Each of the High Contracting Parties declares further that it has no commitments towards any other state or states and shall not undertake any commitments that may cause military damage to the other Party.

Article 11

The present Treaty is signed for a term of twenty years and shall be prolonged automatically for every subsequent period of five years unless one of the High Contracting Parties declares its intention to terminate its operation by notifying the other High Contracting Party 12 months before the expiration of the term of the Treaty.

The Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day the instruments of ratification are exchanged, which will be effected in Moscow within one month after the signing of the present Treaty.

Article 12

Any differences in interpreting any article or articles of the present Treaty that may arise between the High Contracting Parties shall be settled on a bilateral basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Russian, Hindi and English, all the texts being equally authentic, and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in New Delhi on August 9, 1971.

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

A. Gromyko, Minister
of Foreign Affairs

For the Republic of
India:

Swaran Singh, Minister
of External Affairs

Source: Current History, LXIII, 375 (November 1972),
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APPENDIX E

No. 8194. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. SIGNED AT ULAN BATOR, ON 15 JANUARY 1966

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Presidium of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic,

Reaffirming the loyalty of the Soviet and Mongolian peoples to the purposes and principles of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic and the Agreement on economic and cultural co-operation between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic of 27 February 1946,

Expressing the sincere desire of the peoples of both countries to intensify and strengthen further the traditional unshakable friendship and the relations of all-round close co-operation and fraternal mutual assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism,

Firmly convinced that the development of relations between the two countries in this manner is in accordance with the vital interests of the Soviet and Mongolian peoples and with the interests of the socialist community,

Resolved to further in every possible way the preservation and consolidation of the peace and security of peoples in Asia and throughout the world,

Considering that the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on economic and cultural co-operation of 27 February 1946, which have played an historic role in the steady development of relations of eternal friendship and fraternal co-operation between the two countries, are approaching the expiry of their terms and are in need of renewal in the light of the wealth of experience gained in the development of political, economic and cultural relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic and the changes which have taken place in Asia and throughout the world,

Have decided to conclude this Treaty and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries :

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev;

The Presidium of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic :

Yuinzhagiin Tsedenbal,

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties shall continue to strengthen the unshakable traditional friendship of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic and to develop all-round co-operation and fraternal mutual assistance between the two countries on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and intensify economic, scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries in accordance with the principles of friendly mutual assistance and mutual benefit both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the multilateral co-operation of the socialist countries, including the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties shall steadily develop the cultural ties between the two countries through the further expansion of co-operation in the spheres of education, health, science, literature, art, the Press, radio and television, and physical culture and sports.

Article 4

On the basis of and pursuant to this Treaty, separate treaties and agreements shall be concluded between the Governments and between the appropriate institutions and organizations of the two Parties.

Article 5

The High Contracting Parties shall assist each other in ensuring the defensive capacity of the two countries in accordance with the tasks involved in steadily strengthening the defensive power of the socialist community. The High Contracting Parties shall consult together on all major international problems affecting the interests of the two countries or the interests of peace and inter-

national co-operation, and, acting in the spirit of their finest traditions and of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall jointly take all necessary measures, including military measures, with a view to ensuring the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties shall continue their efforts aimed at the preservation and strengthening of international peace and the security of peoples, at the achievement of general and complete disarmament and at the complete elimination of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. The High Contracting Parties confirm their readiness to participate, in a spirit of sincere co-operation, in all international action designed to achieve these lofty aims.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties shall consistently pursue a policy of maintaining and strengthening friendly relations and co-operation among States in Asia and shall act jointly to prevent and remove any threat of imperialist aggression in that part of the world.

Article 8

This Treaty shall not affect obligations assumed by the Parties under existing bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Article 9

This Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Moscow as soon as possible.

Article 10

This Treaty is concluded for a term of twenty years and shall be automatically extended for successive ten-year terms if neither of the High Contracting Parties gives notice of its desire to terminate it twelve months before the expiry of the current term.

DONE at Ulan Bator on 15 January 1966, in duplicate in the Russian and Mongolian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. BREZHNEV

For the Presidium
of the Great People's Khural
of the Mongolian People's Republic:

Y. TSEDENBAL

No. 5122

Source: United Nations Treaty Series #8194

APPENDIX E

SOVIET-VIETNAMESE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the close cooperation in all fields in a fraternal spirit, from the unshakable friendship and solidarity between the two countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism,

Firmly convinced that the endeavour to consolidate the solidarity and friendship between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is in conformity with the basic interests of the two peoples and in the interests of the consolidation of the fraternal friendship and one-mindedness among the countries in the socialist community,

In keeping with the principles and objectives of the socialist foreign policy and the desire to ensure the most favourable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism,

Confirming that the signatories to the treaty acknowledge their international obligation to assist each other in the consolidation and preservation of the socialist achievements recorded by the two people through their heroic efforts and selfless labour,

Determined to work for the unity of all forces struggling for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress,

Expressing their iron-like determination to contribute to the consolidation of peace in Asia and throughout the world, and to the development of good relations and mutually beneficial cooperation among countries with different social systems,

Hoping to further develop and perfect the all-round cooperation between the two countries,

Attaching importance to the continued development and consolidation of the juridical basis of the bilateral relations,

In keeping with the objectives and principles of the United National Charter,

Have resolved to sign this Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and have agreed as follows:

Article 1

In keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism, the two parties signatory to the present treaty shall continue to consolidate the unshakable friendship and solidarity and assist each other in a fraternal spirit. The two parties shall unceasingly develop political relations and cooperation in all fields and endeavour to assist each other on the basis of respect for each other's national independence and sovereignty, equality and non-interference in each other's international affairs.

Article 2

The two parties signatory to the present treaty shall join efforts to consolidate and broaden the mutually beneficial cooperation in the economic and scientific-technological fields in order to push forward the building of socialism and communism and to constantly raise the material and cultural standards of the two peoples. The two parties shall continue to coordinate their long-term national economic plans, agree upon long-term measures aimed at developing the most important sectors of the economy, science and technology and exchange knowledge and experience accumulated in the building of socialism and communism.

Article 3

The two parties signatory to the treaty shall promote cooperation between their state bodies and mass organizations, and develop broad relations in the fields of science and culture, education, literature and art, press, broadcasting and television, health service, environmental protection, tourism, sports and physical training and others. The two parties shall encourage the development of contacts between the working people of the two countries.

Article 4

The two parties signatory to the treaty consistently strive to further consolidate their fraternal relations, and to strengthen the solidarity and one-mindedness among the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

The two parties shall do their utmost to consolidate the world socialist system and actively contribute to the development and defence of the socialist gains.

Article 5

The two parties signatory to the treaty shall continue doing their utmost to contribute to defending world peace and the security of all nations; they shall actively oppose all schemes and manouvres of imperialism and reactionary forces, support the just struggle for the complete eradication of all forms and colours of colonialism and racism, support the struggle waged by non-aligned countries and the peoples of Asian, African and Latin American countries against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism; for the consolidation of independence and the defence of sovereignty, for mastery over their natural resources and for the establishment of a new world economic relationship with no inequality, oppression and exploitation, and support the aspirations of the Southeast Asian peoples for peace, independence and cooperation among countries in this region.

The two parties shall strive to develop the relations between countries with different social systems on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, for the purpose of broadening and consolidating the process of easing tension in international relations and radically eliminating aggressions and wars of aggression from the life of all nations, for the sake of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

Article 6

The two parties signatory to the treaty shall exchange views on all important international questions relating to the interests of the two countries.

In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries.

Article 7

The present treaty does not concern the two parties rights and obligations stemming from the bilateral or multilateral agreements to which they are signatories and is not intended to oppose any third country.

Article 8

The present treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Hanoi as early as possible.

Article 9

The present treaty shall remain in force for 25 years and thereafter shall automatically extend for periods of ten years if neither signatory party declares its desire to terminate the present treaty by informing the other twelve months before the treaty expires.

Done in duplicate in the Vietnamese and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic, in Moscow, this third day of November 1978.

For the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam:

Le Duan
Phan Van Dong
(Signed)

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

L. I. Brezhnev
A. N. Kosygin
(Signed)

Source: Foreign Broadcast Information Service; USSR,
6 November 1978, pp. L7-L9.

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Vietnam - p. 74
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